Approximate map of southern Europe and northern Africa prior to the western Desert Campaign by Jackaranga for Wikipedia “Western Desert Campaign” licensed under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en
(7) GUERRA PARALLELA –
FRANCO-ITALIAN, ANGLO-ITALIAN & GRECO-ITALIAN WAR
(10 JUNE 1940 – 6 APRIL 1941)
It might seem odd to see Italy’s initial role in the Second World War as waging its own ‘guerra parallela’ or parallel war to that fought by Germany, but that was indeed how Mussolini saw it – and what’s more, that is what it effectively was until Italian defeats necessitated German involvement in Italy’s war, at which point Italy became a subordinate in Germany’s war.
It was also of fundamental importance to the Second World War, transforming the Mediterranean from a literal backwater, neutral albeit Axis-friendly, to an active theater of the war – certainly disastrous to Italy itself, ultimately a battlefield in that theater, but arguably to the detriment of everyone involved, hence my favorite epithet for the Mediterranean in the Second World War as the sea of folly.
Apparently prior to Italy entering the war, the British War Cabinet considered whether it was more advantageous for Italy to remain neutral or be a millstone for Germany as ally (or for Germany to be “shackled to a corpse”, using the phrasing for Germany allied to Austria-Hungary in the First World War). They concluded that it would be better for Italy to remain neutral, correctly in my opinion, but by a narrow margin. Italy as active ally to Germany was not the war-breaker for Germany of which Hitler subsequently complained on the eve of final defeat, but it did contribute to German defeat. On the other hand, the Mediterranean was a drain on resources for all involved, arguably delaying Allied victory by at least a year or so, although they could more readily afford that drain on their resources more than a Germany which increasingly could not.
Mussolini initially sought to sit out the war that commenced with Germany’s invasion of Poland – firstly for the sensible practical reason that, as he had confided to Hitler, Italy was not ready for war until 1943 (similarly to German naval commanders who advised Hitler of the same year with respect to the German navy), and secondly for ideological opposition to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
It is unfortunate for Italy and Mussolini personally that he did not maintain this sensible neutrality – as indeed it was that he did not maintain his original opposition to Hitler and Germany, being the only effective such opposition in the period of appeasement by Britain and France, notably by blocking Germany taking over Austria in 1934. It’s why I perceive Mussolini with some sympathy as a tragic figure despite his many flaws, not the least of which was fascism – that he might have redeemed himself in history but for the fatal flaw that he was twice corrupted from his correct initial instincts, firstly of opposition to Germany and secondly of neutrality in the war.
Mussolini abandoned his initial neutrality because he could not resist the temptation of the opportunity from the French defeat by Germany for Italy’s own expansion or empire in the Mediterranean. Although the opportunity came from the French defeat by Germany, Mussolini perceived that Italy could not do so simply by begging crumbs from Germany at the table of victory as a power friendly to it, but would have to assume an active role in the war when it was still meaningful – and what’s more, by its own war effort separate from Germany, hence the ”guerra parallela” or parallel war.
That saw Italy declare war on a dying France and a defeated Britain, although Italy was to find that the latter may have been defeated by Germany in western Europe but was to prove far more robust elsewhere.
Unfortunately for Mussolini and his guerra parallela, Italy’s separate war effort did not shape up to his hopes for it. It was probably inevitable that Italy’s war against Britain in the Mediterranean and Africa would merge with the wider Anglo-German war at some point, but Mussolini might have pulled off his parallel war if Italy had been more successful militarily. Instead, Italy was unsuccessful, infamously and spectacularly so.
Like I did for France in the Franco-German war, I feel obliged to resist the common caricature of Italy’s military performance as execrable, often pumped up as such by contemporary British propaganda – much to the anger of the British personnel who had to do the actual fighting when the Italian military did perform effectively. Italy’s military was not universally bad as so often caricatured but it was inconsistent. The reasons for that inconsistency are manifold, including that Italians did not share Mussolini’s enthusiasm for his guerra parallela on the German side but also the same reason Mussolini himself shared to Hitler – that Italy simply was not ready for war before 1943. Italian military performance often reflected that Italy went to war with a totally inadequate industrial base and wretched equipment to match, particularly outside its most prized military asset – its navy. When Italian forces were buttressed by better equipment and leadership, such as in Rommel’s Afrika Korps, they could fight very effectively indeed.
Mussolini’s parallel war got off to a bad start with the Franco-Italian war, fought in the last fortnight or so (10-25 June 1940) of dying French resistance in the Franco-German war that had commenced fighting in earnest a month before. Albeit Italy did not have the same mechanized or armored strength as Germany – and faced more difficult terrain that would have been a check to it even if it did – for the invasion of south France or the Battle of the Alps as it is called, but the resistance by the few divisions of the French Army of the Alps under General Rene Olry was the one shining light of effective French defense during the Battle of France. I’ve read at least one history that opined the French defensive success effectively preserved south France for the autonomous Vichy regime. I’m not so sure about that, as Vichy’s autonomy seemed more due to the larger bargaining chips of continuing the war through the French navy and colonial possessions, but it probably helped. It certainly limited Italian territorial claims to the minimal territory they had obtained prior to armistice.
Italy’s military performance may have been lackluster in the Franco-Italian war, but that was positively rosy compared to the defeats it suffered in the Anglo-Italian war. Those defeats were, as noted previously, most infamous and spectacular in north Africa where Italy was not only defeated by Britain in its invasion of Egypt but looked in real danger of losing its own territory of Italian Libya to the victorious British forces. However, Britain’s victories against Italian forces in north Africa often overshadow its victories against the Italian forces in east Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia) as well as its naval victories in the Mediterranean, most notably the British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in the first carrier strike of history on 11 November 1940. The attack on Taranto was even more notable as a model the Japanese used for their subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor (along with their own attack on Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War) – and that Britain was notoriously deficient when it came to developing carrier aviation, particularly in comparison to Japan or the United States, with the air attack on Taranto being by the biplanes Britain used in naval aviation at that time.
However, the archetypal example of Italy’s parallel war was the Greco-Italian War it launched from 28 October 1940, attacking Greece from Albania. At least Germany was aware of Italian intentions in the Franco-Italian and Anglo-Italian wars, but Mussolini had deliberately not informed Germany of his intentions for the Greco-Italian War, resentful of what he perceived as German encroachment in the Balkans (by Germany negotiating between Hungary and Romania in conflict over Transylvania) as an Italian sphere of influence.
Once again, Italian forces faced difficult terrain, but also in the worst possible season for it, and were defeated by opposing Greek forces, only somewhat less spectacularly than in north Africa. A large part of the reason for the defeat of Italian forces in both Greece and North Africa was Mussolini splitting the Italian war effort between the two, something the British were to repeat in their victories by sending forces from north Africa to aid Greece.
As noted previously, Italy’s parallel war – the Anglo-Italian and Greco-Italian wars – effectively ended with German involvement to aid Italy at the latter’s request, reversing British or Greek victories with defeats by Germany, as well as subordinating Italy and its parallel war to Germany in the wider Anglo-German war. German involvement had commenced earlier in north Africa but commenced in Greece with the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece from 6 April 1941.
The latter has often been attributed as the fatal mistake that lost Germany the whole war, by delaying Operation Barbarossa until 22 June 1941, including by Hitler himself after the fact (and blaming everyone but himself). That has generally been revised by assessments that an unusually wet spring thaw would have delayed Barbarossa in any event, although it certainly didn’t help that the German units involved in their Balkans campaign were delayed in participating in Barbarossa – and the German airborne invasion of Crete deterred Germany from doing so to better effect elsewhere, most notably against Malta.
RATING: 4 STARS****
A-TIER (TOP TIER)