Top Tens – Film: Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films (10) SF: Dune

Promotional artwork from the 2024 Dune film as the cover for the Frank Herbert book

 

 

(10) SF: DUNE

(2021-2024: DUNE PARTS 1-2)

 

“Walk without rhythm, you won’t attract the worm”

That is of course the lyric from Fatboy Slim’s Weapon of Choice, but like this ongoing film series, it is adapted from Frank Herbert’s SF novel Dune. The music video famously featured actor Christopher Walken dancing through a hotel lobby – and much to my delight of happy synchronicity, he was also in Dune Part 2, and as the God-Emperor no less! I might have squealed a little in my delight at that – although they sadly missed the opportunity for him to re-enact that dance scene in the film.

This is perhaps stretching my usual rule for wildcard tenth place entry as best of 2024 but I’m running with it. For one thing, the sequel film Dune Part 2 was released in that year and it easily was the best fantasy or SF film of 2024. For another, I didn’t actually see the first film when it was released but watched it shortly before seeing the sequel film at the cinema – so in effect both films were in 2024 for me.

And for yet another, with two films under its belt and another on the way, with consummate direction by Denis Villeneuve and a star-studded cast, it is easily the best fantasy or SF film franchise at the moment and the closest thing as successor to the epic Lord of the Rings fantasy film trilogy, particularly as that trilogy is offset by subsequent releases from what is now an expanding film and TV franchise.

As a fan of literary as well as cinematic fantasy and SF, I have to confess that I have never read Frank Herbert’s Dune or any of its sequels, although it is impossible to be a fantasy and SF fan without being aware of its plot or elements, at least in broad outline – archetypal space opera with an archetypal Galactic Empire, desert planet Arrakis, Paul Atreides and the House Atreides, Baron Harkonnen and House Harkonnen, the Fremen, spice, the sandworms, and the Bene Gesserit.

Or for that matter, its influence on subsequent fantasy or SF – it’s hard not see Dune’s Galactic Empire in Star Wars, or Arrakis in Tatooine, or even Paul Atreides in Luke Skywalker (although Star Wars could definitely have done with more Bene Gesserit).

The two Dune films seem to adapt the plot and elements well from what I know of them, particularly given the daunting scale and scope of the literary source to adapt to film (not unlike Lord of the Rings), and in stunning visual style to boot.

 

FANTASY OR SF?

 

Well, it’s obviously classic SF space opera…but like that other classic SF space opera, Star Wars, it has distinct elements of space fantasy.

 

HORROR

 

Like most SF or fantasy, it has some elements of horror – the sandworms can be terrifying – but not predominant or thematic enough to rank the films in the horror genre.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

X-TIER (WILD-TIER) – BEST OF 2024

Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (Special Mention) (3) Axis Cold War

The infamous photograph of British PM Neville Chamberlain showing the Anglo-German Declaration from the Munich Agreement – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Peace for our time”

 

 

(3) AXIS COLD WAR (1931-1941)

 

“Up to now, we’ve succeeded in leaving the enemy in the dark concerning Germany’s real goals…No, they let us through the danger zone. That’s exactly how it was in foreign policy too…They left us alone and let us slip through the risky zone and we were able to sail around all dangerous reefs. And when we were done, and better armed than they, then they started the war.”

That statement by Joseph Goebbels – transcribed by a participant in a secret briefing to selected German journalists and quoted in Paul Johnson’s A History of the Modern World – “is, on the whole, an accurate summary of what happened in the 1930s”.

My previous special mention entry for the Cold War within the Second World War (or vice versa) overlooks that there was, in effect, another cold war that was far more entangled with the Second World War – the three-sided cold war in which Nazi Germany and other fascist states, the western democracies, and the Soviet Union all maneuvered with or against each other.

Indeed, the conventional depiction of the Second World War from 1 September 1939 to 2 September 1945 overlooks that this was simply the ‘hot war’ as the culmination of the longer cold war before that, from 1933 to 1939 for Germany and from 1931 to 1941 for Japan.

And, as the statement by Goebbels indicates, it was a cold war that Germany largely won, outmaneuvering and wrong-footing Britain and France to a remarkable extent.

Yes, it’s arguable – as some historians have argued – that it was the Soviet Union that won it, with the subsequent outbreak of war fought on Stalin’s terms and to his intentions. While there’s some substance to this, I think it overlooks his catastrophic miscalculation that war between Germany and the western democracies would be more protracted and exhausting for the combatants to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Back to Germany, it reflects my own belief that Germany has only succeeded in foreign policy or war when it has, knowingly or otherwise, followed Bismarckian strategy – with Germany’s diplomatic or political successes in the thirties essentially replicating Bismarck’s strategy unifying Germany under Prussia, down to Germany’s successes in annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia mirroring Bismarck’s victories in the Austrian-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, except through diplomatic rather than military force.

Of course, Nazi Germany failed the fundamental part of Bismarck’s strategy – avoiding general war as opposed to a carefully limited one – which ultimately undid all their Bismarckian successes. Even then, Germany managed to succeed coasting on the fumes of Bismarckian strategy – friendly relations with Russia and limiting the scope of the war to successive individual campaigns that resembled Bismarck’s small wars – until 1941.

It has been observed that had Hitler concluded his ambitions with Munich, he might well have been hailed as one of Germany’s greatest statesmen. That certainly accords with my view that the occupation of Prague and what remained of Czechoslovakia was perhaps his fatal mistake, prompting as it did Britain’s guarantee to Poland and dashing any prospect of reclaiming Danzig and other German territory from Poland without war.

Of course, as it turned out, Hitler’s ambitions were not limited to reclaiming former German territory, and given the Germany he led resembled a Ponzi or pyramid scheme that relied on ongoing conquest, it is not at all clear to me whether he could have stopped even if he wanted to do so. I have read that Germany’s need for gold and foreign reserves, as well as the Czech armaments industry, drove Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia as much as Hitler’s sense of buyer’s remorse that – extraordinarily – Britain and France had cheated him of complete victory at Munich.

Azar Gat has also observed that conflict between the western democracies and the fascist nations was one of cold war. Indeed, he observes it to be part of the standard trajectory of liberal democracies facing hostile non-democratic states – “a pattern progressing on an upward scale from isolationism to appeasement, to containment and cold war, to limited war, and, only reluctantly, to fully fledged war”.

The diplomatic and political confrontation of Britain and France with Germany in the 1930s essentially corresponded to evolving from appeasement to containment and cold war within that standard trajectory, except that they didn’t pull the latter off as well as the Americans in the Cold War because they lacked a credible deterrent, particularly that of strategic airpower and the nuclear deterrent the Americans had.

Their deterrent was essentially that of the threat of war, ultimately enacted in the guarantee to Poland. In fairness to Britain and France, that should have been a credible deterrent, as they saw what Hitler did not, that war would ultimately be self-destructive for all of them, reinforcing their decline to the Soviet Union and the United States as the two superpowers.

That standard trajectory flows from the tendency of liberal democracies to eschew preventive war – something the Romans or other pre-modern states would happily do without qualms. “Historically, they have chosen not to initiate war even when they are under threat, hold the military advantage, and are in danger of losing it”.

In effect, the observation of Gat dovetails with the statement of Goebbels in that it is harder to imagine a more clear-cut example of this than against Germany in the 1930s. “The remarkable thing is that the western liberal democracies did not intervene by force during the 1930s to prevent Hitler’s Germany from rearming, even though this meant that the complete military superiority that they held over Germany would be lost, making it possible for Hitler to embark on his radical expansionist policy.”

It remains that Britain or at least certainly France and even Poland – both of which should have been strongly motivated to keep Germany from rearming to attack them – could easily have intervened against Germany without any serious repercussions from 1933 to 1935 when Germany broke the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles restricting its military forces, such as when it introduced conscription or its air force.

That window of opportunity for intervention without serious repercussions probably remained open to France (and Britain) until 1936, when it could – and should – have intervened against Germany remilitarizing the Rhineland, which would have decisively defeated Hitler’s regime and may well have seen its collapse. That’s even more striking given that France (and Belgium) had no issue intervening to occupy the Ruhr industrial area when a weakened Weimar Germany sought to resist reparations in 1923. The same action probably would have won the war without fighting in 1936.

Much the same observations might be made of the Soviet Union, particularly in its choice of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact without which Germany could not have started the war – as opposed to any other choice, such as collective security with Britain and France or even just neutrality, that would have deterred Germany from war.

Thereafter however, Britain and France faced the prospect of war when it came to opposing Germany, once Germany had rearmed and fortified its western borders sufficiently to move to the next phase of occupying its two neighbors, Austria and Czechoslovakia. The latter – with the Munich Agreement that accompanied it – has become synonymous with appeasement, particularly as a pejorative term. That seems somewhat unfair, particularly for Britain and Neville Chamberlain. It might well have been better for Britain and France to declare war on Germany over Czechoslovakia, but the competing arguments seem finely balanced to me and it is easy to imagine the potential outcome might have been even worse than what happened with Poland a year later.

It just illustrates the various ironies or paradoxes that can be argued with respect to appeasement. One is that Britain and France enforced the wrong provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (reparations as opposed to military restrictions), or appeased the wrong Germany (Nazi Germany as opposed to Weimar Germany). Another is that they practised appeasement from a position of military superiority or strength when it made no sense, only to abandon it from a position of weakness when they could not effectively deter Germany, let alone effectively defend Czechoslovakia or Poland, at least without Soviet participation.

Yet another irony or paradox is that they appeased the wrong nation, alienating Japan and Italy, allies against Germany in the first world war, to the extent that those nations allied with Germany against them instead.

The alienation of Japan as an ally commenced as early as the 1920s, with perhaps one of the worst foreign policy mistakes by Britain – failing to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan is of course the reason this entry commences prior to the Nazi regime in 1933, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and continues after the start of the European war in 1939, as the various nations opposed to Germany – increasingly and primarily the United States – also faced off Japan until 1941.

The response to Japanese expansionist policy deserves as much attention as that for Germany – and each could well be the subject of its own top ten list. The failure to respond effectively to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 – which was at least possible by Britain and the United States in combination – was arguably as much a mistake as the failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance and certainly compounded it.

Thereafter, a large part of Britain and France being out-maneuvered by Germany in Europe arose from their need to deal with Japan in Asia at the same time, particularly after Japan expanded its aggression to China in 1937. That continued to confront the allies with tough strategic choices after the commencement of war in Europe, obviously even more so once the allies also had to divide their resources between that war and the war with Japan. At very least, the war with Japan added a year to the war in Europe.

Britain and France repeated much the same errors with Italy in the 1930s, continuing to 1940 when Italy joined Germany to declare war on them allied – again to ultimate effect that the war with Italy or war in the Mediterranean arguably added a year or so to the war with Germany. Italy’s support also arguably made Germany’s war possible in the first place, by opening up Austria and Czechoslovakia to German occupation. Fortunately, that was offset to some degree by Italy’s weakness as strategic liability to Germany. Amusingly, the British War Cabinet considered whether they were better off with Italy as neutral or with Italy as actively allied to Germany, before concluding (probably correctly if only just) that it would be better if Italy remained neutral.

The errors alienating Italy to ally itself with Germany are even more striking as Mussolini’s Italy was strongly aligned towards the allies against Germany well into the thirties – and arguably remained so at the level of its populace and institutions, a large part of why its performance as German ally was so mediocre. Indeed, Italy was initially a stronger opponent to Germany’s expansionism than Britain or France, successfully blocking Germany from taking over Austria in 1934.

The turning point was the response of Britain and France to Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia, which saw them get the worst of both worlds – initially opposing Italy, antagonizing Italy without showing any real teeth (such as by the use of naval forces or use of sanctions on oil, to which Italy was particularly vulnerable), which they then compromised by the secret but abortive Hoare-Laval Pact to appease Italy by partitioning Abyssinia.

Thereafter, while Italy still aligned itself with Britain and France against the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, it increasingly and inevitably began to align itself with Germany.

And the rest, as they say, is history.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD-TIER)

Top Tens – TV: Top 10 Fantasy & SF TV Series

Poster art for Archer Season 10, titled Archer:1999 – a reference to the 1975-1977 SF TV series Space: 1999 (and hence a nod to the anachronistic retro vibe of Archer’s main continuity)

 

Sigh. My Top 10 Fantasy & SF TV Series may be the most fluid of all my top ten lists.

Many, perhaps most, simply miss the mark for me at the outset. Those that do hit the mark generally fall away quickly or don’t have an enduring quality – or they endure too long, waning until they limp into their final season and fail to stick the landing. The recent archetypal example, for me as it was for so many others, was Game of Thrones, in which the failure to stick the proverbial landing – or dare I say it, King’s Landing (heh) – in the final season left a bitter taste that filtered back throughout the series or at least its later seasons.

Hence, I tend to have a high turnover for shuffling or ranking entries into my special mentions, with so few entries having the consistent or enduring quality to rank in the top ten itself – or remain there. And to be honest, most of my present entries are pretty shaky.

In fairness to myself, there’s also my separate Top 10 Animated TV Series, in which my entries are somewhat more enduring – and animation by its nature tends to be fantasy or SF. Indeed, all but the top entry in my present top ten are clearly fantasy or SF, and the top entry (Archer) has so many substantial SF elements as to be borderline SF. (One season was outright SF and there’s a reasonable argument for the other seasons as alternate history given their anachronistic timeline and divergence from our own world in which they are nominally set.)

Like my Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films, my Top 10 Fantasy & SF TV Series leans predominantly towards SF. Only one entry is clearly fantasy, although the distinction between SF and fantasy seems far fuzzier in most of the other entries than it does for SF films. As I did for films, I will note each entry as fantasy or SF, but with a section (Fantasy or SF?) for the fuzziness of the distinction.

It’s also interesting how much supernatural or SF horror features in my Top 10 Fantasy & SF TV Series, as well as how many superhero comics adaptations – both of which I will note in each entry.  Four of the entries, including the top entry, arguably fall within the horror genre (with arguable horror elements in two or three of the others) – and an entry is an adaptation from superhero comics, albeit far removed from the A-list characters.

Anyway, these are my Top 10 Fantasy & SF TV Series.

Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (Special Mention): (2) Cold War

 

The Iron Curtain – map showing the political division of Europe after World War II ended up until the end of the Cold War by Semhur for Wikipedia “Iron Curtain” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

 

(2) COLD WAR – LONG WAR 1914-1991

 

Well this one’s also obvious, isn’t it?

Perhaps not as obvious as the First World War but close to it as the Cold War seamlessly evolved from, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Second World War – indeed perhaps inevitably, as in the colorful phrase (and essay title) of historian Joseph Lieberman comparing the Cold War combatants to “the scorpion and the tarantula in the bottle”.

I’m not sure whom Lieberman intended to be the scorpion or the tarantula – but the bottle was the Second World War and its aftermath in the opposing occupations of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union. Sometimes you drink the bottle and sometimes the bottle drinks you…

Other commentators, commencing with Philip Bobbitt in The Shield of Achilles, have even combined the world wars and cold war into a single continuity, the so-called Long War of the twentieth century or 1914-1991.

On the other hand, the Second World War also cut across the continuity of the Cold War – a temporary interbellum or suspension of hostilities between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, as an alliance against Germany and the other Axis powers, albeit one that resembled a marriage of convenience.

Or rather, a shotgun marriage, one that was thrust upon them. Neither Cold War antagonist chose its involvement in the Second World War – or at least the manner or timing of that involvement, as both were attacked first (and in the case of the United States, had war declared on it by Germany).

Of course, the hostilities began to bubble back to the surface as Allied and Soviet defeat of Germany loomed ever larger, becoming more overt when there was no longer the common enemy of Germany or Japan to unite them.

However, the continuity with the Second World War is inescapable. While the Cold War may have originated from opposition to the Soviet Union from 1917 onwards, it took its particular shape from the Second World War, such that it is difficult to imagine otherwise.

The Cold War antagonists of the United States and the Soviet Union were effectively the two last men standing, with the other great powers defeated or exhausted from the war – although that had essentially been the reality of power in the world from 1917 onwards, albeit masked by their isolationism, self-imposed or otherwise.

And the battle lines or fronts were effectively drawn by the territory each occupied or controlled after the war.

The western front of the Cold War – Europe – was effectively drawn by the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe – such that it was the immediate source of conflict in the Cold War, infamously as the Iron Curtain. Even the exceptions to the rule of Soviet occupation, Austria and Finland – exceptional in that they avoided regimes imposed on them by the Soviets – had neutrality imposed upon them instead. (Yugoslavia was arguably another exception, but primarily because it had largely liberated itself outside of Soviet occupation and did not directly border the Soviet Union itself).

Similarly to the Western Front of the First World War, it was largely a static front of siege or stalemate – static not by millions killed in trench warfare but by the prospect of millions dead in nuclear war (or renewal of war on the scale of the Second World War), as well as the resources spent on opposing armed camps.

The eastern front of the Cold War – Asia – was far more volatile, having been effectively drawn by the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Korea – firstly with the communist victory in the Chinese civil war (which made the eastern front even more volatile) and secondly with subsequent wars with communist governments in Asia, particularly in Korea and Vietnam.

 

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – Film: Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films

Promotional art for the 1982 fantasy film, The Beastmaster. Amazingly, it became a cult classic. Even more amazingly, it became a franchise, with two sequel films and a television series. The film was shown on HBO so often that comedian Dennis Miller joked HBO stood for “Hey, Beastmaster’s on!”. And yes – it’s not that good but it’s a guilty pleasure of mine.

 

 

“Fantasy isn’t just a jolly escape: It’s an escape, but into something far more extreme than reality, or normality. It’s where things are more beautiful and more wondrous and more terrifying.” – Terry Gilliam

That’s how I introduced my Top 10 Fantasy Books and it’s even more apt for my Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films, given I feature Terry Gilliam in my special mentions as one of my favorite directors of fantasy or SF films.

Although, the definition of fantasy might be less apt as my Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films overwhelmingly leans towards SF, with eight entries as SF and only two entries as fantasy. As such, I will note each entry as either fantasy or SF.

In fairness, I might well have ranked more films as fantasy, or SF for that matter. When I compiled my top ten ‘non-genre’ films, I noted those with fantasy or SF elements. The same applies to my top ten comedy films. The distinction is that the fantasy or SF elements did not predominate in those films so as to rank them within the fantasy or SF genres but the elements are still there.

More substantially, I also have separate top tens for animated films, films adapted from comics, and horror films – each of which predominantly consist of films that could be ranked within the fantasy or SF genres. Animated films lean towards fantasy, films adapted from comics lean towards SF (albeit often functionally or outright fantasy for superheroes), and I have deliberately leaned my top ten horror films towards fantasy or supernatural horror.

Ironically, at least three of the SF entries in this top ten could be ranked as horror or more precisely SF horror (a sub-genre also reflected in the special mentions for my Top 10 Horror Films). Given the overlap of both fantasy and SF with horror, I will also note where an entry might have also been ranked as horror or arguably has elements of horror.

Anyway, here are my Top 10 Fantasy & SF Films. Just a quick note – if you’re looking for The Lord of the Rings or Star Wars, I rank them in my special mention entries. The former is because as much as I love that film trilogy, it is eclipsed by my love of the book trilogy, ranking it in top spot in My Top 10 Fantasy Books. The second is because I have a complicated love-hate relationship with the original Star Wars film trilogy – and that trilogy has been somewhat diminished by them running the franchise into the ground since. Which, to be honest, they’ve also pretty much done with The Lord of the Rings franchise, what with the Hobbit film trilogy and the Rings of Power TV series.

Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (Special Mention) (1) First World War

Map of the participants in World War One by Thomashwang for Wikipedia “World War” licensed under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) FIRST WORLD WAR – GREAT WAR 1914-1945

 

I mean, this one’s obvious, isn’t it?

It’s impossible to consider the Second World War except as a continuation of the First World War, or at least originating in the latter’s aftermath. After all, it’s effectively implied in the names.

Indeed, their continuity has become a matter of serious historical study, possibly more so as time passes from the twentieth century, for the two world wars to be looked at as one.

Some have argued for the two world wars as the Second Thirty Years War. Others have argued for the two world wars as the war of 1914-1945, two periods of fighting with a twenty years armistice between them – indeed, as Marshal Foch, the French supreme commander of Allied forces on the Western Front, was said to have proclaimed upon the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

Note that Marshal Foch’s proclamation was not, as fashionable historiography tends to these days, because those terms were too harsh, but because they were too lenient – a viewpoint that I am increasingly inclined towards, or at least that the Versailles Treaty was not that bad.

Note also that Marshal Foch’s proclamation is apocryphal, attributed to him variously by the subsequent French prime minister (during the Second World War) Paul Renaud or by Churchill.

The Great War 1914-1945 was indeed the title of a book compiled from different historians writing on the continuity or parallels between the two world wars, most strikingly (heh) in the first volume, subtitled Lightning Strikes Twice.

Some of those parallels or that continuity are or is obvious, particularly the role of Germany that, unreconciled to its defeat in the First World War, took another swing at re-fighting the same war again in the Second. I am a fan of the Fischer Thesis – the argument by German historian Franz Fischer that Germany essentially pursued the same aims in both world wars, that is an imperial policy (or weltpolitik) for Germany to transform itself into a world power by a continental empire in eastern Europe and Russia (or Mitteleuropa).

The other obvious parallel or continuity is the defeat of Germany in both – lending itself to the thesis by my favorite Second World War historian H.P. Willmott of the myth of German military excellence. As he paraphrases Oscar Wilde (from the Importance of Being Earnest) – to lose one world war might be counted as misfortune, to lose two looks like carelessness. As I like to quip, all German leadership achieved in both world wars was their encirclement and attrition by enemies with superior resources.

And indeed, I am persuaded by Willmott’s thesis that, as demonstrated by both world wars, German military genius lay in fighting not war. That is, that in both world wars Germany demonstrated a profound misunderstanding of war, particularly the limits of military and national power – something Willmott observes Bismarck understood, but his successors who led Germany did not.

Even here, though, there are key points of distinction – perhaps foremost among them that Germany appeared to do substantially better in the Second World War than in the First. Ironically, that is because Germany followed a more Bismarckian political diplomacy prior to and at the outset of the Second World War, although that began to unravel once Germany committed itself to war, aptly enough as something Bismarck himself strove to avoid in his foreign policy once Germany was united.

Ultimately, Germany’s initial success was because it had its Brest-Litovsk moment from the First World War at the outset of the Second – the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, securing economic resources from the east and a free hand in the west.

That is, as opposed to achieving it too little and too late as it did with the original Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the newly formed Soviet Union in the First World War’s penultimate year of 1917 – after it had been effectively exhausted fighting on two fronts, and which ultimately led to decisive defeat on the Western Front.

On that point, the Soviet Union proved far more resilient and robust in the Second World War than its imperial Russian predecessor – and even its former self in 1917-1918 – in the First. Hence the ironic reversal that where Germany won on the Eastern Front and lost on the Western Front in the First World War, it won on the Western Front and lost on the Eastern Front in the Second.

Similarly, the United States had become stronger with a consequently larger role in the Second World War than it had in the First. One might quip that the Second World War was German romping about continental Europe crushing its smaller and weaker adversaries, until it drew the two true world powers in to crush it.

On the other hand, France proved far less resilient and robust in the Second World War, albeit something that was very much connected with the costs of fighting the First. That saw Germany achieve in a few weeks in 1940 what it failed to achieve in 1914 or indeed the four years of fighting that followed.

Another key distinction was in the roles of Italy and Japan that, formerly on the side of Allies in First World War, allied themselves with Germany in the Second – arguably a failure of Allied political diplomacy more profound than the appeasement of Germany itself, leading as it did to Italy and Japan each effectively adding a year to the war against Germany.

Once allied to Germany, Italy played a similar role to the former Austria-Hungary as Germany’s major European ally (and ironically Italy’s traditional adversary in the First World War and before) – down to the Germany description of each alliance as being “shackled to a corpse” – as well as to the Ottoman Empire against Britain in the Middle East, albeit from the opposite direction (west rather than east against Egypt).

Japan however played an entirely new role in Asia and the Pacific from anything comparable in the First World War – hence the Second World War assumed a truly global character well beyond that of the First World War, the latter sometimes being dubbed as a European Civil War.

I can’t resist including the somewhat cryptic quip by H.P. Wilmott that, paradoxically, WW2 might be regarded as the last war of the 19th century and WW1 was the first war of the 20th century. I understand that to mean WW2 was closer to 19th century wars, in part because the technology and technique of offensive mobility won out over defensive firepower and attrition – albeit briefly and with waning effect through the war’s duration – while its predecessor was more characteristic of the static 20th century wars of attrition that followed it.

Or alternatively, my own observation that WW2 was closer to the model of the Franco-Prussian War, at least in its European opening, or the Napoleonic Wars in its continuation within Europe. On the other hand, WW1 was closer to the American Civil War as the true precursor of twentieth century warfare, with the western front of the latter resembling the eastern theater of the latter, only with even more lethal firepower. Ironically, however, WW1 finished by armistice in a manner closer to the Franco-Prussian War except with France and Germany reversed, while the WW2 was fought to unconditional surrender like the American Civil War.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (Special Mention)

Map of participants in World War Two by Svenskbygderna – Wikipedia “World War” licensed under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

 

 

But wait – there’s more!!

I’ve compiled my Top 10 Second World Wars – one of my top ten lists where I look at a subject which has a fundamental continuity but which also can be demarcated into distinct parts in their own right. If you prefer, you can think of it as my Second World War iceberg meme – in this case an iceberg of Second World War continuity.

My usual rule is twenty special mentions for each top ten list, where the subject permits – and here it did, not surprisingly given the sheer scale of the Second World War.

Indeed, I could have had more entries. For example, I could have included an entry, perhaps even in my top ten, for the Franco-German war as I did for the Anglo-German war (or more precisely, the Anglo-American war against Germany). That would reflect it was the third such war in 70 years, after the 1871 Franco-Prussian War and of course WW1). However, while its formal duration might be considered to be from the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 to the French surrender on 25 June 1940, the actual fighting was over quickly – in a few weeks similar to the Franco-Prussian War – and thereafter the ongoing war (on its western front) was the Anglo-German war.

Other potential entries included the Lapland War, the war by Finland on Germany required as a condition of peace between the Finns and the Soviets, or the brief Franco-Thai war fought between the Vichy French colonial administration in Indochina and Thailand in 1940-1941. However, I noted the former in my top ten entry for the Soviet-Finnish war, and the latter just didn’t seem special enough for special mention.

Anyway, these are the special mentions for my Top 10 Second World Wars.

Top Tens – Tropes & Other: Top 10 Golden Ages

The Golden Age – fresco by Pietro da Cortona (public domain image used for Wikipedia “Golden Age”)

 

 

TOP 10 GOLDEN AGES

 

Yes – it’s a top ten on the spot for my Top 10 Golden Ages.

Golden Age was my top entry for my Top 10 Ages – for usage of the term age in culture or history – connoting the best, either as primordial paradise or peak perfection. As I noted in that entry, it has been adapted for common usage to connote peak periods in history or culture, more than enough for its own top ten. So here it is!

 

(1) CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY – GOLDEN AGE

 

The OG Golden Age – the original usage in classical mythology to connote the primal paradisiacal state of humanity, as by Hesiod or Ovid.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOLD TIER)

 

(2) BIBLICAL – GARDEN OF EDEN

 

“When the apple reddens,

Never pry,

Lest we lose our Edens,

Eve and I”

 

The only other OG Golden Age to rival that of classical mythology – and with, dare I say it, the core concept explicit or implicit in a Golden Age, that of original sin to go with our original paradise. Every Eden has its serpent, its forbidden fruit or its temptation – else how does a Golden Age fall?

Eden was of course the original earthly paradise, but arguably Biblical mythology has the promise of a return to Golden Age paradise in heaven.

You could also argue for the reigns of King David and King Solomon as the Golden Age of Biblical Israel, after which it would be divided into two kingdoms, each of which would fall in turn. Not coincidentally, David was so golden that it is from his lineage the Messiah was prophesied to rise (Jesus for Christianity and still to come for Judaism), through whom heaven and earth will return to its golden age.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOLD TIER)

 

(3) ARCADIA & UTOPIA

 

Et in Arcadia Ego.

Arcadia “refers to a vision of pastoralism and harmony with nature”, from the classical Greek province of the same name “as a poetic byword for an idyllic vision of unspoiled wilderness” or garden for shepherds.

As such, it combines something of the Golden Age of classical mythology and the Garden of Eden – “it is seen as a lost, Edenic form of ife, contrasting to the progressive nature of Utopian desires”.

Hence Arcadia tends to evoke an unattainable and lost Golden Age from the past, while Utopia – despite its literal name “no place” originating from Sir Thomas More’s book of that title for a fictional island – usually evokes at least a potential Golden Age in the present or future.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

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(4) ROUSSEAU – STATE OF NATURE

 

“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”

Perhaps the most enduring modern mythic golden age – Rousseau’s idyllic “state of nature”, as encapsulated in the “born free” part of his iconic quotation of it.

On the other hand, it is opposed by the equally enduring mythic dark age state of nature proposed by Hobbes.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(5) CHILDHOOD

 

Okay, okay – perhaps we don’t have to go so far as to propose the state of nature as golden age, what with life in it being “nasty, poor, brutish and short” as declared by Hobbes, but instead propose our state of innocence and joy in childhood as a golden age? Or narrow it even further to our hypothetical state of bliss in the womb – the subconscious or primal memory of which is often proposed as the origin of myths of paradise or golden ages from which we have fallen.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(6) CLASSICAL GREECE / ATHENS

 

And now we come to the first of my top ten entries for golden ages proposed for peak periods of culture or history – the Golden Age of Classical Greece or Athens, an Athenocentric golden age proposed for classical Greece of Athens from 480 BC to 404 BC, from Persian to Peloponnesian Wars and including the Age of Pericles.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(7) PAX ROMANA / THE FIVE GOOD EMPERORS

 

The zenith of the Roman Empire, considered by Edward Gibbon writing in the eighteenth century as the happiest time of human history.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(8) MERRIE ENGLAND

 

Perhaps more mythic than historic – “a conception of English society and culture based on an idyllic pastoral way of life that was allegedly prevalent in Early Modern Britain at some time between the Middle Ages and the onset of the Industrial Revolution”.

 

Or an “essential Englishness with nostalgic overtones”. Think William Wordsworth – or the Shire.

 

“A world that has never actually existed, a visionary, mythical landscape, where it is difficult to take normal historical bearings.”

 

On the other hand, the Elizabethan era is often proposed as the Golden Age of England, while the Victorian era is proposed as the Golden Age of Britain.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(9) GRAND SIECLE  / BELLE EPOQUE

 

One can’t propose the Golden Ages of England or Britain without proposing the Golden Ages of France – the Grand Siecle of the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV, or the Belle Epoque of the Third Republic from 1871 to 1914, the latter period often extended to a golden Age of continental Europe or European civilization as a whole.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(10) HOLLYWOOD (AMERICAN CENTURY & AMERICAN DREAM)

 

Finally, what embodies the American golden age – the American Century and the American Dream – more than Hollywood?

 

There is also often proposed a Golden Age of Hollywood itself, from 1910 to 1969 or so.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (Complete Top 10)

 

Screenshot of collage of images used as feature image for Wikipedia “World War II” – some public domain (top right, middle left, bottom left and right) and others (top left and middle right) licensed from German archive footage under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en

 

TOP 10 SECOND WORLD WARS

 

One of my favorite quips is that the Second World War is the American Iliad while the Cold War is the American Odyssey.

As usual, I’m joking and serious – but seriously, I’d go even further in that the Second World War is the modern Iliad, the modern historical epic of war.

And as such, I thought I’d compile my Top Second World Wars

Wait – what? Top 10 Second World…Wars? Plural?!

No – I’m not missing another noun there, such as Top 10 Second World War Battles, Top 10 Second World War Theaters, or Top 10 Second World War Campaigns. Those are subjects for their own top ten lists, indeed quite extensive ones, along with other Second World War subjects, albeit there is some overlap between theaters or campaigns and the present subject.

No – this isn’t some rhetorical sleight of hand, where I define some other previous conflicts as the first and second world war respectively. Again, the subject of conflicts that might be categorized as world wars – including but beyond the two world wars labelled as such – is surprisingly extensive, deserving of its own top ten.

So…what then? Wasn’t there only the one Second World War?

Well, yes – except perhaps when there wasn’t.

My tongue is (mostly) in my cheek – it’s one of my top ten lists where I look at a subject which has a fundamental continuity… but which also can be demarcated into distinct parts in their own right. If you prefer, you can think of it as my Second World War iceberg meme – in this case an iceberg of Second World War continuity. Hence, I won’t be doing my usual top ten countdown but just counting them out.

I can illustrate my point by posing a simple question – when did the Second World War start?

A simple question with what seems a straightforward answer – 1 September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland.

But is it so straightforward? Well, perhaps for the fundamental continuity of the war waged by and against Germany, but that is to focus on Europe rather than Asia. If one shifts to a historical focus on the latter, one might well substitute 7 July 1937, with Japan launching its full-scale war on China. Even then, one could look back to the earlier Japanese invasion of Manchuria on 19 September 1931 – or for that matter, even in Europe, to the background to the German invasion of Poland.

And that is my point. While wars may have a fundamental continuity that leads to them being described as a single whole in history with definitive starting or ending dates, they may also consist of – or evolve from or into – overlapping conflicts, particularly when they have a sufficient span or scale. Perhaps none more so than considering the largest war in history, at least in absolute terms, fought on a global scale for six years – the Second World War.

What is my baseline of the Second World War – or surface of the Second World War continuity iceberg? I define it according to the conventional historical frame and timeline of the Second World War – the war against Germany and its allies, subsequent to its invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, outlasting the surrender of Germany itself for a few months against Germany’s last ally standing, Japan, until the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945.

So that said, these are my Top 10 Second World…Wars.

 

German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa from 22 June 1941 to 25 August 1941 – public domain image map by the History Department of the US Military Academy

 

 

(1) NAZI-SOVIET WAR / GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

(22 JUNE 1941 – 8 MAY 1945)

 

Wait – what?

Wasn’t the Nazi-Soviet War – called the Great Patriotic War by the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia – essentially just the Second World War, as in the central or primary theater of military conflict of the war? The First Front, as Winston Churchill readily admitted in his history of the war?

Yes – and that’s my point. The Nazi-Soviet War might well be viewed as THE Second World War – with all the other conflicts in the Second World War overlapping or as preludes or aftermath to the war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

And it is a war that can effectively be considered or studied in isolation from other theaters or conflicts, as a subject all of itself. Or indeed, many subjects, including as subject or subjects of its own top ten lists – notably battles, but arguably even of a top ten wars list or continuity iceberg like this.

It was fought, on land and in air, between the armed forces of the Soviet Union and those of Germany with its European allies – the latter often overlooked, albeit Germany remains of primary importance – with little overlap, at least in terms of military forces, with the other conflicts or theaters elsewhere. Yes – there were also naval forces involved but they were peripheral to the scale of conflict on land and in air.

The primary overlap – in terms of military forces was of course the increasing drain of military commitments imposed by the Western allies on Germany or its European allies in other fronts – albeit for Germany’s European allies that included their increasingly desperate search to desert their alliance with Germany for exit strategies from the war.

However, those commitments remained secondary, even arguably a sideshow, to Germany’s primary conflict on its Eastern Front. Sometimes I quip that the Second World War was, for the Western allies, a timely Anglo-American intervention in a Nazi-Soviet War. Timely that is, for the fate of western Europe and Germany itself, that might otherwise have seen more extensive Soviet occupation and one or two irradiated cities – as at the time of the Normandy invasion, the Soviet Union was quite capable of defeating Germany on its own.

Note that I am speaking in terms of military forces. The Western allies did of course also provide extensive economic support to the Soviet armed forces but I’m speaking strictly in terms of armed forces in actual fighting – as per Stalin, “how many divisions has he got?”. However, it is a pet peeve of mine when people attribute the survival of the Soviet Union in 1941 or even 1942 to Allied economic support or Lend-Lease. Such things are difficult to quantify and Allied economic support certainly aided Soviet victories from 1943 onwards, probably decisively – but that role is far less clear for the successful Soviet defense of itself in 1941 or 1942 as the large majority of Lend-Lease was delivered from 1943 onwards.

There is also its sheer scale of combatants and casualties – still the largest invasion and land war in history.

In terms of scale of combat, the Soviet Union mobilized over 34 million men and women for its armed forces – almost twice as many as the next largest combatant, Germany (as well as more than twice as many than either the United States or China.

Indeed, the Soviet Union represented more than a quarter of men or women mobilized in the entire war (over 127 million). And when one considers that the large majority of men mobilized by Germany (about 18 million) were for its war with the Soviet Union, as it was for its European allies, then easily over a third of all men and women mobilized for armed forces in the Second World War were or in for the Nazi-Soviet War.

Not to mention the scale of casualties – the Soviet Union had almost 27 million people killed, at least a third of the highest estimates for 80 million people killed in the whole war. When you consider once again the large majority of those killed for Germany and its European allies were in the Nazi-Soviet War, then you’d be getting close to half all casualties in the entire war – particularly if one were to include casualties for Poland (and I think there’s a strong argument for that).

There’s also the sheer scale of impact – which can be simply stated that on any account of it, the Nazi-Soviet war was the decisive conflict within the Second World War. It’s instructive to recall the ideologies underlying this impact – and perhaps a bit humbling to reflect how much the victory of liberal democracy in the twentieth century depended on the contigency of the casualties communism could sustain fighting fascism (as well as the concentration of economic power in the United States).

And then there’s the narrative of the Nazi-Soviet war, reasonably well known in broad outline albeit somewhat distorted or obscured in historiography until recently.

The broad outline essentially follows each year of the war. The first year of war – from 22 June 1941 to June 1942 essentially follows the German invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa – and its defeat in its advance on Moscow.

The second year of war – from June 1942 to June the following year – essentially follows the German campaign in Case Blue against Stalingrad and the Caucasus – and its defeat.

The first two years of the Nazi-Soviet War often seem to present something of a paradox, as observed by H.P. Willmott:

“From today’s perspective, it seems incredible that Germany could have conquered so much of the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942 and that on two separate occasions could have brought her to within measurable distance of defeat. Hindsight provides the element of inevitability that suggests German defeat in his campaign was assured because the first time, Hitler raised the scale of conflict to levels that Germany could not sustain…and herein lies a paradox: before the campaign began there would seem to have been no means whereby Germany could prevail, yet once the campaign started it would seem impossible for her to lose”.

That paradox is resolved by a closer study of the war, but a large part of it is that the Soviet Union fought back from the outset, if not always well then certainly hard – imposing costs in casualties and time which Germany and its allies ultimately could not pay.

Something of this can be observed in the diminishing returns of Germany’s successive campaigns – that whereas the German campaign in 1941 was on all three parts of the front (north, central, and south – albeit shuffling between them as it went), the German campaign in 1942 was only on one part of the front, in the south.

Those returns diminished further with the German campaign that commenced the third year of the war – Operation Citadel against Kursk – where the German campaign was not only on one part of the front, the centre, but a smaller part even of that. And for the first time, the German campaign was defeated in the summer when it was launched.

Thereafter, the Germans were on the defensive or outright retreat from the relentless Soviet advances, albeit slowly in that third year. While it was the Soviet army that had originated (prior to the war) the true ‘blitzkrieg’ of the war – the concept of the ‘deep battle’ or ‘deep space battle’, a strategy aimed at destroying enemy command and control centers as well as lines of communication – it lacked the means to employ this strategy fully until the fourth year of war, when it had sufficient elite or experienced armored and mechanized formations as well as the logistics and mobility to support them.

And oh boy, it showed with the Soviet campaign that opened the fourth and final year of war – Operation Bagration, named for a Russian general in the Napoleonic Wars, on the anniversary of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June. The Red Army took one of Nazi Germany’s three army groups on the Eastern Front, Army Group Center in Belorussia and Poland, completely by surprise – effectively destroying it, while exposing Army Group North to siege in the Baltic states and Army Group South to attack in the Balkans.

Operation Bagration well deserves to be compared as equal to the success of Operation Barbarossa for Nazi Germany, but without the same sting of ultimate defeat as the latter – although at least one subsequent Soviet campaign was arguably even better.

Indeed, by 1945, it is possible to argue, as Willmott does, the complete transposition of the German and Soviet armies in terms of military proficiency. By 1945, “the operational and technical quality of the Soviet army was at least the equal of the Wehrmacht at its peak” (with the Soviet Vistula-Oder offensive in January 1945 “perhaps the peak of Soviet military achievement in the course of the European war”).

On the other hand, “the German army of 1944-45, for all its reputation, had the characteristics so meticulously catalogued when displayed by the Soviet army in 1941: erratic and inconsistent direction, a high command packed with place-men and stripped of operational talent, the dead hand of blind obedience imposed by political commissars upon an officer corps despised and distrusted by its political master, failure at every level of command and operations”.

 

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Battle of Britain map – public domain image (Wikipedia – “Battle of Britain”)

 

 

(2) ANGLO-GERMAN WAR

(1 SEPTEMBER 1939 – 8 MAY 1945)

 

This is the big one – the war everyone thinks or talks about for the Second World War, mostly because of the predominance of Anglophone history and popular culture

The war that started with the German invasion of Poland and Britain’s declaration of war on Germany to honor its guarantee to Poland, with a familiar narrative after that – Dunkirk and the fall of France, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the war in the Mediterranean and Battle of El Alamein, and ultimately landings in north Africa, Italy, and France.

And yes – the Anglo-German war between Britain and Germany became what would more accurately be described as an Anglo-American war with Germany.

Even for the latter, however, the term Anglo-German war is apt as the Anglo prefix is as applicable to the United States as to Britain, whether in Anglophonic or Anglospheric terms (or both). Indeed, Hitler saw Germany’s ultimate contest for world power against the United States and its economic predominance – which he sought to offset by a Europe united under Germany and particularly by a German empire over the resources of the Soviet Union, with Russia in a similar role to Germany as India in the British Empire (at least as argued by historians such as Adam Tooze).

For that matter, that Anglo prefix is as applicable to the Dominions that were major combatants within the British Commonwealth – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa.

However, one should not overlook that for a year of the Second World War, from June 1940 to June 1941, the Second World War was almost entirely an Anglo-German war, with Britain as the only major combatant opposed to Germany, albeit with its Dominions and the Commonwealth.

That was a war very different from what might be characterized as the Franco-German war in the First World War – where France held the line on the Western Front and consequently remained the primary or supreme Allied combatant on land. Of course, Britain and France had the same hope for the Second World War, but the Franco-German component of the war effectively ended with the fall of France, with the primary contest no longer between French and German armies as in the First World War.

Instead, Britain found itself engaged in a war in which it relied predominantly on sea power and airpower against a German army which had won predominance in continental Europe. Of course, Britain had traditionally relied on sea power, as it did in both world wars – adding airpower in the Second World War – and sought to rely on allies with larger forces on land to bring to bear against its opponents.

On the one hand, Germany lacked the sea power and airpower to be able to defeat Britain. It might be observed that all of its major opponents in the Second World War, Germany was only able to defeat France – Britain had too much sea power and airpower, the Soviet Union was too big, and the United States combined the worst of both those worlds along with oceanic distance.

On the other hand, Britain could not defeat or even challenge German predominance on land, even with those allies briefly conjured up on the continent, Greece and Yugoslavia.

As H.P. Willmott noted in The Great Crusade:

“At no point could she challenge Germany’s control of western Europe. Never in British history, not even at the height of British naval supremacy, had British sea power been able to challenge, let alone defeat, a great continental power, and by 1940 the superiority of overland communication meant that German military forces could be moved in greater numbers and more quickly that any British force that attempted to establish itself on the mainland. In addition, the reality of the situation was that British naval power in 1940 was barely able to ensure Britain against defeat by the strangulation of her trade”.

In a sense, this was the war that both Britain and Germany had anticipated in the contest between them, both politically before the war and in the war itself – in which Britain stood as the guardian of the world order and of its world empire or power, secured by victory in the First World War, which Germany sought to challenge.

In The Winds of War, American author Herman Wouk has his German military analyst von Roon evocatively label the war as the War of British Succession – Germany’s bid for world empire to succeed Britain’s falling one – although even von Roon ruefully notes that all it (and the Soviet war effort) achieved was to see one Anglo-Saxon world empire replaced by another.

In that, it was arguably already too late – with the contest between Britain and Germany just shadowboxing over an illusion of world power that had already been eclipsed by the two true world powers, and which would only endure until those two powers ended their isolationism (or had it ended for them) to step into the conflict.

Britain’s strategic hope ultimately relied on the substitution of another power for France as ally with large forces on land to bring to bear against Germany. That hope was understandably focused on the United States but ultimately Britain saw not only one but two powers in that role, eclipsing Britain itself in the war and in the world – firstly the Soviet Union on the eastern front and secondly the United States on the western front.

However, even then it took some time for the United States to eclipse Britain in its army and air force in the European theater – the former in terms of American divisions engaged in combat shortly after the Normandy landings – although the British navy remained predominant in the Atlantic.

Speaking of scale, while even the Anglo-American war against Germany remained secondary to the Nazi-Soviet by a substantial margin, at least on land, it was still of an impressive magnitude – with the invasion of Normandy remaining as the largest seaborne invasion in history.

And speaking of the Normandy invasion, the Anglo-American landings throughout the war remain impressive, not least as that superiority of overland communications for Germany remained a factor to be overcome throughout the war. It is impressive that the Anglo-American alliance pulled off successful major landings not just once but three times – not counting the various minor landings on or about the same time – in north Africa in 1942, in Italy in 1943 (both Sicily and the mainland), and most of all in France in 1944, with the Normandy landings a military feat unequalled then or since.

Once again, while not so much a war in its own right as the previous entry – at least after 1941 given it overlapped with (and relied) on the Nazi-Soviet war to engage the majority of the German army – it is a war that can be a subject all of itself, or indeed many subjects, including that or those of its own top ten list or lists.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

Map of the Pacific War 1943-1945 by user San Jose for Wikimedia Commons under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(3) PACIFIC WAR

(7 DECEMBER 1941 – 2 SEPTEMBER 1945)

 

The Eagle against the Sun!

And yes – that’s the title of a book by historian Ronald Spector, one of the best single volume histories of that war.

Like a mirror image of the Nazi-Soviet War on the opposite side of the world and in the vast expanses of sea rather than those of land, the Pacific War was the other central conflict of the Second World War, the war between the United States and Japan as the largest naval war in history.

And yes – again that’s my point, that the Pacific War might well be considered as a war in its own right and indeed having its own title as such, with which the other conflicts in the Second World War (and other wars in Asia) can be seen as overlapping or as prelude or aftermath.

As such, it is a war that can be subject all of itself. Or indeed, many subjects, including as subject or subjects of its own top ten lists – notably battles, but arguably even of a top ten wars list or continuity iceberg like this

It is a war that can effectively be considered or studied in isolation from other theaters or forces other than those of Japan and the United States – as indeed it was fought, with little overlap except the so-called CBI theater (for China-Burma-India) with which it merged to some extent.

Certainly, it was almost entirely separate from the conflict in Europe, except to the extent that it was a secondary commitment to that conflict for the United States in the guise of its Germany First strategy. It’s interesting to consider the possibility that it might have remained entirely separate, but for the German declaration of war on the United States after Pearl Harbor. Of course, on the other hand it is difficult to envisage how the United States would have entered the war but for Pearl Harbor.

However, as H.P. Willmott observes, the American Germany First strategy was somewhat belied by the disposition of American forces in 1943, which more resembled a Pacific First strategy. It was certainly not the case for the American navy, for which the Pacific War remained its primary theater of operations throughout the war – and for the Marines, for which it was their exclusive theater of operation.

While similar in scale, the Pacific War lacked the decisive impact of its Nazi-Soviet counterpart, as Japan was that much weaker than Germany and that much outmatched by its American opponent in the long term that the ultimate outcome was effectively a foregone conclusion.

However, while some parts of the narrative of the war are well known, there often seems to me a curious hiatus in popular culture or imagination about that narrative as a whole.

And that curious hiatus is the Pacific War in popular culture or imagination seems to leap from the dramatic victories of Japan at the outset of the war in the six months from December 1941, at Pearl Harbor and onwards through South East Asia through to its equally dramatic defeat and reversal of fortune in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 – to the dramatic victories of the United States in Iwo Jima or Okinawa in 1945, effectively within the home island territories of Japan itself, or perhaps in the Philippines in 1944 at earliest. Of course, it helps that the staged photograph of the Marines raising the American flag in victory at Iwo Jima is one of the most iconic photographs of the war, if not the most iconic photograph.

In other words, it seems to skip the hard-fought campaigns from 1942 to 1944 or 1945 that brought the United States to those home island territories of Japan – including one of the best and most hard-fought American campaigns in the whole Pacific War, fought in the most arduous circumstances before the American quantitative and qualitative material advantages became truly overwhelming against its Japanese opponent, the campaign in and for Guadalcanal.

In fairness, those campaigns often seem like slogging matches over small islands, yet ironically without the decisive or big battles that capture popular attention or imagination. The latter was increasingly by design, particularly after the Marine casualties capturing the Tarawa atoll in November 1943, when the Americans improved their amphibious landing tactics – but even more so changed their strategy, substituting island-hopping or leapfrogging in which they bypassed Japanese strongholds such as Rabaul to “wither on the vine”.

As such, although they were often surprisingly resilient even when bypassed, many Japanese soldiers were simply left stranded without supplies, dying of starvation or disease without sighting an enemy soldier – or dying again without directly engaging any enemy combatant when their ships were sunk by American submarines.

In that, they reflected the situation of Japan itself, simply writ large for Japan as it was increasingly strangled by the American submarine campaign against its shipping. I often opine on the American submarines as the unsung victors of the war with their decisive contribution to American victory. With a smaller submarine fleet than Germany and initially defective torpedoes to boot (das boot? – heh), it managed to achieve what Germany did not – destroying the shipping of a maritime empire to bring that empire to its knees, albeit helped by Japan’s woeful neglect of anti-submarine warfare.

Japan’s problems were compounded in that it faced not one but two American campaigns in the Pacific – arising from the split between the American navy and army, which essentially saw two separate campaigns by them, the American navy campaign in the central Pacific, and the American army campaign in the south-west Pacific.

(Of course, Japan had its own issues with such a split, only much worse – which effectively saw a successful navy coup in 1944 against the army government under Tojo that had launched the war with the attack on Pearl Harbor).

It may have been better, as historian John Ellis opines, to have resolved the split and focus on the one campaign – the south-west Pacific with its shorter distances – but the fact remains that the Americans had the resources for both while Japan increasingly lacked them for either.

As H.P. Willmott observes, the Pacific War was the second such war fought by the United States as it mirrored an earlier war – the American Civil War:

“Between 1941 and 1945, Japan was to the United States what the Confederacy had been 80 years before, and the parallels between the two wars were very considerable. Both wars, each about four years in duration, saw the United States opposed by enemies that relied upon allegedly superior martial qualities to overcome demographic, industrial and positional inferiority, but in both wars the United States’ industrial superiority and ability to mount debilitating blockades proved decisive to the outcome. In both wars, the United States was able to use the advantages of a secure base and exterior lines of communication to bring overwhelming strength to enemies committed to defensive strategies, and which were plagued by divided counsels, while in the military aspects of both wars there were close similarities…

The Union drive down the Mississippi that resulted in the capture of Vicksburg in July 1863 and the separation of the Confederate heartland from Texas has its parallel in the drive across the south-west Pacific to the Philippines to separate Japan from its southern resources area. The battles in the two-way states that culminated in the march through Georgia were not dissimilar from the central Pacific offensive that took American forces to Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the shores of the Japanese home islands”.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

The extent of Japanese occupation of China in 1940 – public domain image Wikipedia “Second Sino-Japanese War”

 

(4) SINO-JAPANESE WAR

(18 SEPTEMBER 1931 – 27 FEBRUARY 1932 / 7 JULY 1937 – 2 SEPTEMBER 1945)

 

This is the other big one but in reverse to the Anglo-German war – the war no one thinks or talks about for the Second World War, despite its scale, not least reflected in Chinese casualties second only to the Soviets

That omission or oversight in popular culture or consciousness is reflected in the usual historiography of the Second World War commencing with the German invasion of Poland, rather than the Japanese war with China that commenced two years earlier – or arguably six years before that with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

Well, for Europeans or Eurocentric history at least – it obviously gets more attention in Asian history. More accurately, it was the Second Sino-Japanese War, after the First Sino-Japanese war fought between Qing China and Japan in 1894-1895.

In fairness, it was largely isolated to the combatant nations of China and Japan. The actual combat was isolated to China itself, given that the Chinese forces involved could barely defend themselves or their territory. By barely I mean with extensive losses and limited longer term prospects of continuing to do so without outside aid or intervention, let alone any prospects of ejecting Japanese forces or taking the war to Japan. And of course, isolated is a relative term, given the scale of war with China as the world’s most populous nation and one of its largest in size.

I say largely isolated because there were various degrees of foreign involvement in support to China or on the edges of the war itself. The former surprisingly included aid from Germany at the outset, until Germany aligned itself with Japan and started its own war in Europe – prompting much of the foreign involvement on the edges of the war with Japan seeking to cut off routes of supply to China or resources for its own war effort in south-east Asia, ultimately leading to the larger Pacific War.

Also in fairness, the war received reasonably widespread attention at the outset, both for the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and for the Japanese war with China from 1937, the latter most infamously for the R*pe of Nanking or Nanjing, the Chinese southern capital that the Chinese Nationalist government could not defend and had to abandon.

I am only familiar with the basic highlights of the war until the European war in 1939 – the loss of Nanjing of course and the loss of Shanghai that preceded it, the Chinese Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek deciding to blow up the dams of the Yellow River to flood the North China plain to slow the Japanese advance in 1938, and the Chinese government having to retreat first to Wuhan and second to Chungking as its capital.

Looking it up, the battle of Wuhan in 1938 was the largest battle of the war – Wuhan was lost but China managed to hold the city of Changsha through two battles in 1939 and 1941, as well as win victory at Taierzhuang in 1938. In fairness to myself, the major combat operations in this period of the war from 1938 to 1941 are usually not common knowledge.

And in fairness to world attention at the time, the Sino-Japanese war was not only overshadowed by the war in Europe, but also largely settled into stalemate – where Japan had mostly defeated Chinese forces in battle but lacked the forces to extend its occupation further beyond coastal cities or railways in a country that remained overwhelmingly hostile to it. At the same, Chinese forces lacked the ability for anything other than a defensive strategy – that is, avoiding open battle as much as possible while looking for salvation from outside forces, with the Nationalists and Communists also looking ahead to renewed civil war with each other.

However, Japan still had one surprise left for China, even while it was virtually collapsing in the Pacific War against the United States, and one that is almost entirely forgotten or overlooked in most Second World War histories – the Ichigo offensive in 1944. The largest Japanese army offensive of the whole war, it was also the last successful Japanese offensive – astonishingly so and on a scale unequalled for anything else by Japan or Germany at that late stage of the war.

It was the last of a series of Japanese blows that ultimately proved fatal for the Chinese Nationalist government in the subsequent civil war with the Communists – Japan arguably doing the most of anyone, including the Chinese Communists themselves, to win victory for the Communists in the civil war.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Occupation of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 by Lonio17 for Wikipedia “Occupation of Poland (1939-1945)” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

 

 

(5) FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND / POLISH WAR

(1 SEPTEMBER 1939 – 8 MAY 1945)

 

The invasion and partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union – in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which as popular historian Paul Johnson pointed out was something of a misnomer for what was more accurately a Nazi-Soviet aggression pact against Poland.

Speaking of Paul Johnson, he records an interesting vignette of how easy it was to forget Poland as casus belli of the European war. One guest swept his arm around at a London society wedding on 10 January 1946 to exclaim “After all, this is what we have been fighting for”, only for a female guest to retort “What, are they all Poles?”

And indeed, the invasion of Poland by Germany on 1 September 1939 was the commencement of the Second World War in Europe. The Soviet invasion followed on 17 September 1939, effectively to claim the Polish territory assigned to it under the Pact which in turn reclaimed the territory lost to Poland in the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921. But for the Pact, Germany could readily have occupied all of pre-war Poland. As it was, Poland ceased to exist as a state – and alone among the states occupied by Germany, did not have its own collaborationist government but instead the German-administered General Government.

The title of Fourth Partition of Poland is used by some historians in reference to the Three Polish Partitions – the three partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1772 to 1795 by Russia, Prussia and Austria that progressively reduced the Commonwealth until it was eliminated as a state altogether by the third partition and completely divided up among the three partitioning parties.

However, other historians have pointed out that it might well be reckoned an even higher numbered partition – depending on how one reckons the subsequent restoration of Poland under Napoleon in 1807 and its partitions in 1815 (Congress of Vienna), 1832, 1846, 1848, and 1918 (Treaty of Brest-Litovsk).

I have classed the Fourth Partition of Poland as one of my top ten Second World Wars – indeed in top tier – as the German (and Soviet) war against Poland continued throughout the Second World War, albeit behind other active fronts, particularly in Poland itself behind the Eastern Front.

Active military fronts that is – Poland itself was the front line (or ground zero) of the war Germany fought against the populations of the nations it occupied, above all the Holocaust with it mostly occurring in camps in Poland and Polish Jews representing about half the tally for the Jewish population of Europe killed.

Of course, the most active part of the German war against Poland was its original campaign in September 1939 – which one book title christened as The War Hitler Won, and as H.P. Willmott observed in The Great Crusade, was a war Germany won before a single shot was fired due to its material and positional superiority over Polish forces.

The German victory still surprised observers at the time as being a matter of weeks rather than months. Poland might have had better prospects if weather – General Mud – had been more on its side, if its defense had been better planned or timed, and above all if Britain and France had properly planned or coordinated an offensive against Germany on the Western Front. The failure of the last has been considered as part of the larger Western Betrayal argued by Poles and Czechs from Munich to Yalta.

Even so, Polish forces defended Poland impressively – notably inflicting a similar proportion of casualties (for German personnel killed in action) as the French did in far better defensive circumstances the following year. That was despite the Soviet invasion on 17 September transforming the Polish situation from hopeless to completely hopeless – although as H.P. Willmott points out, it did little to change the military situation in reality other than to remove the Polish option of holding out in the so-called Romanian Bridgehead. As it was, some Polish forces held out even after the fall of Warsaw on 28 September, enduring until the last of them surrendered on 6 October, while others fled or escaped.

However, the war did not end there, either for Polish armed forces or in Poland itself.

With respect to the former, those Polish armed forces that managed to escape or flee continued fighting in Allied forces elsewhere (or in resistance within Poland), particularly as the Polish Armed Forces in the West, led by the Polish government-in-exile based first in France and then in Britain. Indeed, “Polish armed forces were the fourth largest Allied forces in Europe after the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain”, albeit reliant on arms and supplies from other allies.

Among the western allies, Poles served with distinction – perhaps the most famous examples being Polish airmen in the Battle of Britain and the Poles as the Allied “shock troops” in the Battle of Monte Cassino. The Polish navy and merchant marine also fought in the Polish Armed Forces in the West.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviets either released Polish personnel to serve in the Polish Armed Forces in the West or had them raise the Polish Armed Forces in the East, the latter more to Soviet ideological taste.

Arguably even more impactful was the Polish contribution to Allied intelligence. Apparently almost half “of all reports received by the British secret services from continental Europe in between 1939 and 1945 came from Polish sources” – and the Polish intelligence network described as “the only allied intelligence assets on the Continent” (after the French surrender).

Most impactful of all was the vital Polish intelligence contribution towards the decryption of the German Enigma codes, delivered to the western allies only five weeks before the war, and which underlay the British decryption known as ULTRA. Polish intelligence didn’t end there but also provided the Allies with key intelligence about the German camps, V-1 and V-2 rockets, and submarines, as well as an intelligence network for north Africa.

The Polish intelligence contribution to Allied victory has been described as “disproportionately large” and much more effective “than subversive or guerilla activities”.

Speaking of subversive or guerilla activities, finally there was the war in Poland itself – or rather the war on Poland itself. The German campaign may have ended but if anything that only represented an escalation in the German war on Poland – with far more Polish casualties from occupation than the military campaign in 1939. Poland has one of the highest casualties in absolute terms for those killed in the war – approximately 6 million, almost all civilians and over half of which were Polish Jews – and the highest as a proportion of its population, approximately 17%.

Of course, that wasn’t all the German occupation – a small proportion was from the Soviet occupation, most infamously the captured Polish soldiers killed by the Soviets at Katyn.

That prompted Polish resistance movements and the Polish Underground State, with an overall strength that was the largest or one of the largest resistance movements in Europe – in which the largest Polish resistance organization was the Home Army (Army Krajowa or AK), although there was a plethora of other organizations.

The Polish resistance fought two famous uprisings in Warsaw – firstly, the Warsaw Ghetto Rising by the Jews against deportation to the camps in April 1943, and secondly (even more famously and on a larger scale), the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944 as Soviet forces advanced on the city. Equally as famously, those Soviet forces sat it out while the Germans crushed the Uprising, destroying Warsaw far more thoroughly than the German campaign in 1939 did. The Soviet forces were at the limits of their supply and logistic chains, but they were also not inclined to do too much to address that (or otherwise assist the western Allied air forces to drop aid to the Poles), given the convenience of Germany destroying the non-communist Polish resistance.

H.P. Willmott observed the irony that Germany treated Poland atrociously and France leniently, while the reverse might have better suited Germany’s purpose. I have observed that I do not understand why Germany crushed the Warsaw Uprising, when it might have suited Germany better to withdraw to another defensive line, leaving it intact as a potential thorn in the side for the Soviets.

I’ve left the end date of this entry as the surrender of Germany but in effect part of the Polish resistance or underground war and indeed of the partition of Poland continued afterwards with respect to the Soviets – with the latter continuing to this day and onwards, as Poland never retained the loss of its territory from the Soviet part of the Pact.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Map showing the Soviet Union’s 1945 Invasion of Manchuria, also known as Operation August Storm – based on David Glantz’s maps in Levenworth Paper No 7 – Feb 1983 used in Wikipedia “Soviet invasion of Manchuria” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

 

 

(6) SOVIET-JAPANESE WAR

(11 MAY – 16 SEPTEMBER 1939 / 8 AUGUST – 2 SEPTEMBER 1945)

 

It has always struck me as somewhat anomalous that two of the major combatants of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan, scrupulously avoided fighting each other for almost all the conflict, despite being on opposing sides and despite it obviously being to the detriment of Japan’s ally Germany.

Not that, on the latter point (and according to my reading), Germany particularly sought out Japanese involvement in its war against the Soviet Union – at least not until Germany’s initial victories began to wane to the point that Germany considered it might need Japanese involvement after all, by which point it was too little too late.

Hence Japan signed the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 13 April 1941, a little over two months before Germany invaded the Soviet Union – reflecting how little Germany had coordinated with or even informed Japan with respect to its intentions. Hence also the term scrupulously I used for the Soviet Union and Japan avoiding fighting each other – scrupulously that is, in terms of abiding by the Non-Aggression Pact.

And as I stated before, despite that scrupulousness on Japan’s part obviously being to the detriment of Japan’s ally Germany – reflected in, among other things, about half of American Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union in the war against Germany being shipped through the Pacific, as long as the ships had Russian flags (which I anticipate would simply have been a matter of lending them those ships or assigning ships Russian flags).

It’s even more anomalous when one considers the long-standing Japanese hostility to the Soviet Union – and indeed the Russian empire before that, Japan’s first European military adversary. Japan had both the largest and longest military intervention in the Russian Civil War, which persisted until Japan finally withdrew from Siberia and the Russian Pacific Far East in 1922.

The initial target of the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s was also the Soviet Union – outside of course the Japanese annexation of Manchuria, from which Japanese militarists began looking towards the Soviet Union – before that particular party of militarists was suppressed by other militarists looking towards China and elsewhere, although that didn’t stop repeated minor clashes with the Soviet Union on the Manchurian border or in Mongolia.

One can see why the Soviet Union stuck scrupulously to the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in its existential struggle against Germany, but less so for Japan. One factor was of course that both the navy and Japan’s need for resources, particularly oil, advocated the “Southern Strategy” against European Asian colonies (and the United States) as opposed to the “Northern Strategy” (against the Soviet Union) that was the contending strategy proposed, typically by the army, in war councils.

The other factor was the healthy respect that Japan had for the Soviet forces opposing them – something I share in terms of my uncertainly whether any Japanese involvement against the Soviet Union in 1941, when it was most optimal for Japan (and Germany), would have actually made any different to the outcome.

That respect arose from the first of the Soviet-Japanese wars that did occur during the Second World War, interestingly enough with those two wars bookending the main conflict at start and finish.

Indeed, the first Soviet-Japanese war commenced six months before the commencement of the war in Europe with the German invasion of Poland and indeed continued for a fortnight or so into the European war. However, it was kept mostly secret by both combatants – the Soviet Union presumably to avoid undermining its position against Germany and Japan because its army was soundly defeated by that of the Soviet Union, notably at Khalkhin Gol.

The Japanese defeat in this war, particularly at Khalkhin Gol, has taken on some notoriety in history since the Second World War – rightly so in my opinion, as having an importance on the outcome of events in the Second World War that were somewhat obscured by its secrecy at the time. In some ways, it is a pity that it wasn’t publicized more widely – as it, and Japanese intelligence on the strength of Soviet forces, might otherwise had some impact on German decisions, at least if the latter had been in the minds of more rational actors.

The other Soviet-Japanese war bookend came at the end of the Second World War, after Germany had surrendered – and in the form of the Soviet Union honoring its promise to the United States to commit to war against Japan. Ironically – and somewhat incredibly – Japan at this time harbored delusions that, consistent with the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviets could help Japan negotiate a more lenient peace.

Instead, the Soviets scrapped the Pact and absolutely smashed Japan’s Kwangtung Army in Manchuria – indeed proceeding into Korea and Japan’s northernmost island possessions.

While the Japanese army had previously romped through China in the absence of the latter’s industrial capacity and hence armored forces, now it faced the Soviet army – pretty much defined by its armored forces or tanks – honed to perfection fighting and winning against Germany.

As the War Nerd (Gary Brecher) colorfully observed in a column on this war – “This was a campaign between two great empires—both gone now, it occurs to me—but one, the Soviet, was at the absolute top of its game, and the other, Imperial Japan, was dying and insane.”

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

Offensives of the four Soviet armies in the Winter War from 30 November to 22 December 1939 – public domain image in Wikipedia “Winter War”

 

 

(7) SOVIET-FINNISH WAR – WINTER & CONTINUATION WARS

(30 NOVEMBER 1939 – 13 MARCH 1940 / 25 JUNE 1941 – 19 SEPTEMBER 1944)

 

The Soviet-Finnish wars have an odd place in the continuity of the Second World War – almost like Schrodinger’s wars, at the same time both within and outside the main continuity, with the latter effectively saving Finland from the same fate of occupation and unconditional surrender as Germany.

The Winter War has quite the notoriety within Second World War history, primarily for the obvious Soviet expectations of a walkover only to be undone by the Finnish underdog against the odds.

The ultimate Soviet goals in that war are contested, although most seem to agree that it was the complete occupation of Finland – consistent with restoring other former Imperial Russian territory to the Soviet Union, as with Poland and the Baltic states.

Whatever they were, they had to evolve as a result of the skilful and stubborn Finnish resistance that is the stuff of legend, while the Soviets seem to double down on one disaster after another.

But evolve they did, to a more realistic strategy not based on Finland conveniently collapsing from the first push – and which had seen Soviet overconfidence in attacking at the worst time of year for it in terms of seasonal weather. Ultimately, Finland had to negotiate while they still had the means to avoid worse defeat.

The Soviet-Finnish wars weren’t done, however, as the Soviets reaped the harvest they had sown in the Winter War with what the Finns called the Continuation War – the Finnish participation in the German invasion of the Soviet Union. That title reflected the common perception or intention that the war was to reverse the losses of the Winter War and no more, though some Finns argued for more ambitious war aims of a Greater Finland.

Whatever the Finnish goals in the Continuation War, Finland held itself aloof from Germany as much as possible, even to the extent of identifying as co-belligerent rather than ally and not signing the Tripartite Pact – which resulted in the United States never formally declared war on Finland.

Finland also refused to advance beyond certain points and had to demobilize part of its army from economic necessity in 1942. Finland was also the first to see the logic of German defeat if Germany could not secure a quick victory, attempting to start peace negotiations with the Soviet Union as early as autumn 1941.

And once again Finland managed to save itself with the Soviets accepting a more limited outcome than the occupation or unconditional surrender of Finland. That outcome did however require the Finns to declare war on Germany and eject German troops from Finland.

That saw the third and final war fought by Finland, this time against Germany in the Lapland war – which mostly came to an effective end in until November 1944 although some German troops held out until 27 April 1945, shortly before the surrender of Germany itself.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

Territories under partisan control in September 1944, public domain map in Wikipedia “World War II in Yugoslavia”

 

 

(8) YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WAR & WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

(6 APRIL 1941 – 25 MAY 1945)

 

“In April 1941, the Axis powers conquered Greece and Yugoslavia and thereafter the real struggle for the control of those countries began.”

That’s how H.P. Willmott summed it up in The Great Crusade, his history of the Second World War. While Greece will earn a place in my special mentions, the partisan warfare in Yugoslavia deserves its place in my Top 10 Second World Wars.

That’s because of two reasons – its scale and the effectiveness of the partisans under Tito.

The former is reflected in its casualties, with Yugoslavia having one of the highest death tolls by population, usually estimated as at least one million (or approximately 7% of the population), of which over half were civilian.

The partisans were no slouches in number of combatants either – originally a guerilla force aided by their country’s mountainous terrain, they switched to a conventional force apparently numbering 650,000 in 1944 (and increasing to 800,000 in 1945) in four field armies in 52 divisions, with a navy and air force.

Their effectiveness is usually considered in terms of being Europe’s most effective anti-Axis resistance movement in the war – unique or almost unique among such movements or partisans to liberate their country with their own forces during the war.

(In its article on the Yugoslav Partisans, Wikipedia nominates Yugoslavia as “one of only two European countries that were largely liberated by its own forces during World War II” – I recall the other is Albania, although I also recall Greek partisans had liberated substantial parts of Greece).

Of course, they didn’t and probably couldn’t do without outside help. They were aided by joint operations with the Soviet operation against Belgrade, the national (and Serbian) capital. They were also aided throughout by logistics and air support from the western allies.

More substantially, they were aided by Germany’s priority to commit forces elsewhere against the Soviets or western allies, as well as by the desertion of Germany’s allies, both those allies surrendering to switch sides and of forces fielded in Yugoslavia itself, often literally deserting to join the partisans.

Even so, Germany and its allies came very close to destroying the partisans in spring and summer 1943 – that is, before the reversal of fortunes from the surrender of Germany’s most significant ally in Europe, particularly in terms of forces occupying Yugoslavia, Italy.

This illustrates that the Yugoslavian war of liberation was no simply two-sided affair, but rather a bitter battle royale on all sides – summed up by a quip from John Irving’s Setting Free the Bears to the effect that it was a hard war if you didn’t change sides at least once.

On what might be described as the Axis side, there was of course Germany, which had primarily defeated Yugoslavia in April 1941 but had then largely left the occupation of Yugoslavia to its allies – Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and their various client regimes, most notoriously the Ustashe of Croatia. That is, until the surrender of Italy and the threat of Allied landings in the Mediterranean extending to the Balkans forced Germany to commit more substantial forces.

On what might be described as the Yugoslav side, there was actually a multi-side civil war, albeit primarily between Tito’s communist partisans and the royalist Chetniks, although there were also the collaborationist forces of Axis client regimes as well as, bizarrely, the White Russian émigré “Russian Protective Corps”. The Chetniks increasingly collaborated with the Axis forces, with the Allies ultimately abandoning them to support Tito’s partisans.

Tito and his partisans emerged victorious as Yugoslavia’s postwar communist or socialist government, naming the war they had won as the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution. However, because they had won it largely with their own forces, they were able to remain outside the Soviet bloc – unlike the other eastern European communist states which had been essentially imposed by Soviet forces – effectively defecting from it in what was famously the first major split within the communist world, the Tito-Stalin split.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

Eritrea Campaign 1941 – map by Stephen Kirrage for Wikipedia “East Africa Campaign” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

(9) ITALO-ABYSSINIAN WAR / EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

(3 OCTOBER 1935 – 19 FEBRUARY 1937 / 10 JUNE 1940 – 27 NOVEMBER 1941)

 

Yes, everyone forgets (or overlooks) this war when it comes to the Second World War (or before it) – or indeed forgets or overlooks that any part of the Second World War was fought in Africa apart from North Africa.

Even if the Italo-Abyssinian War – or more precisely the Second Italo-Abyssinian War (or Second Italo-Ethiopian War to use its more modern but decidedly less glamorous nomenclature) – was fought on a scale to rival the Winter War, at least in numbers of troops, and for substantially longer.

Okay, the Italo-Abyssinian War received substantial attention at the time and since, as the second act of Axis aggression after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and another stepping stone towards the breaking point of the postwar international order after the First World War – but not so much the details of the war itself.

Its sequel during the Second World War, the East African Campaign, is almost completely overlooked on the other hand, let alone in any detail, despite being “the first Allied strategic victory in the war” and not without its challenges.

I’m fond of quoting H.P. Willmott’s quip that, paradoxically, WW2 might be regarded as the last war of the 19th century and WW1 was the first war of the 20th century.

Whatever else you take that to mean, it seems most apt to describing the war in East Africa, as a throwback to the Scramble for Africa and contest between European colonial powers.

Indeed, the Second Italo-Abyssinian War was literally a throwback to the First Italo-Abyssinian War, that last gasp of the Scramble for Africa in which the only African polity to preserve its independence, Abyssinia, did so by soundly defeating Italy at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, one of the few African defeats of a European colonial power. (Yes, I’m aware of Liberia as the other “independent” state in Africa but it was effectively an American creation).

In the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Mussolini’s Italy set out to use its massive superiority in weaponry to avenge – and reverse – its defeat in the First Italo-Abyssinian War, invading and occupying Abyssinia. The First Italo-Abyssinian War might have surprised the world (and inspired Africa) with an Abyssinian victory, the Second Italo-Abyssinian War did not with its Italian victory, albeit Abyssinian resistance and a government-in-exile under Emperor Haile Selassie persisted afterwards.

In the longer term, Italy’s choice to invade Abyssinia seems foolish, given how isolated and vulnerable even a victorious Italian occupation of Abyssinia would be to superior British and French naval power if war broke out. That perhaps should have been the case back in 1935 but certainly turned out to be the case with Britain’s East African campaign during the Second World War – which Britain won, against skilful and protracted Italian defense that is also often overlooked for a general and somewhat unfair caricature of Italian military competence during that war.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

Attack on Mers-El-Kebir harbor 3 July 1940 by Maxrossomachin for Wikipedia “Attack on Mers-el-Kebir” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

 

(10) ANGLO-FRENCH WAR

(3 JULY 1940 – 10 NOVEMBER 1942)

 

It’s another war that tends to be forgotten or overlooked when it comes to the Second World War, similarly to the Italo-Abyssinian War and East Africa Campaign – perhaps not coincidentally because it was the other war within the Second World War that involved fighting in sub-Saharan Africa.

It was also something of a historical throwback but even further back than to the nineteenth century and the Scramble for Africa. Instead, it was throwback to the Anglo-French wars fought from 1689 to 1815 – dubbed the Second Hundred Years War.

Of course, it was a pale shadow of the former Anglo-French rivalry for nothing less than global dominion – evoking the quip of Marx that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Yes, it was fought as part of a war effectively for global dominion – but not so much by Britain or France, and the fighting between them was at the fringes or periphery of the larger war.

Indeed, Britain only fought France to pre-empt Germany (or Japan) – and was mostly limited to fighting France or Italy at the fringes or periphery of its war with Germany because it lacked the ability or means to attack Germany directly. Or as historian H.P. Willmott observed – “In this initial period, Britain, expelled from the continental mainland and unable to carry the war to Germany, was obliged to fight where she could rather than where she would”.

The war was technically not Anglo-French war but Anglo-Vichy war, which effectively was also a civil war between the German puppet Vichy regime in France and the Free French government, contested not in France itself but in – and for control of – the French colonies. With the safety of distance and the lack of strategic importance, most of the French colonies aligned with the Free French – with the significant exceptions of French North Africa and Indochina.

It was also not continuous but sporadic, with fighting isolated to brief campaigns in dispersed locations.

The first of these campaigns was the British naval attack on French navy ships at Mers El Kebir in Algeria on 3 July 1940, “the main part of Operation Catapult, the British plan to neutralize or destroy French naval ships to prevent them falling into German hands” after France surrendered to Germany. That played a large part in Vichy hostility to Britain that saw Germany court the Vichy regime – and Spain – as active allies against Britain in 1940 but fortunately both Vichy France and Spain declined to abandon their neutrality for war against Britain.

On 23 September 1940, Britain and Free French forces under de Gaulle launched Operation Menace to take the Vichy port of Dakar in French West Africa, but withdrew on 25 September 1940 when they met fierce resistance from Vichy forces – the one British defeat in the Anglo-Vichy war.

Otherwise, French colonies in Africa aligned themselves with the Free French, although one colony – French Equatorial Africa or Gabon – had to be occupied by Free French forces with British support in a campaign from 27 October 1940 to 12 November 1940 before the Vichy colonial government surrendered.

From 8 June to 14 July 1941, British and Free French forces fought and won the Syria-Lebanon campaign to capture those Vichy territories, effectively to pre-empt Germany (and Italy) exploiting them against Britain in the Middle East, as with the coup Germany had sponsored in Iraq to install an anti-British regime – which Britain crushed in May 1941.

From 5 May to 6 November 1942, British forces fought the Battle of Madagascar to capture that Vichy territory for Free French control, effectively to pre-empt Japan using it as a base for naval forces to seal off the Indian Ocean – something of a missed opportunity by Japan.

The final campaign in the Anglo-French war – which also included a brief Franco-American war – was of course Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa. The Vichy regime in North Africa initially resisted before by good fortune the Vichy commander Admiral Darlan was captured and effectively defected to the Allies, nominating himself as the leader of French North Africa and West Africa with their forces now on the Allied side. Vichy France itself effectively ceased to exist as Germany now occupied all France, although Germany kept up some semblance of the puppet regime in occupied France and subsequently as government-in-exile in Germany.

The Anglo-French war prompts to mind the snide observations by historian Gerhard Weinberg which he posed as questions for World War Two historians – why Britain was so consistently defeated by German and Japanese forces until the Battle of El Alamein (such that its only consistent victories were against French and Italian forces), and why Vichy France strongly resisted Allied incursions but so readily gave up Germany or Japan without resistance.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

TOP 10 SECOND WORLD WARS (TIER LIST)

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

(1) NAZI-SOVIET WAR

(2) ANGLO-GERMAN WAR

(3) PACIFIC WAR

 

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

(4) FOURTH POLISH PARTITION

(5) SINO-JAPANESE WAR

 

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

(6) SOVIET-JAPANESE WAR

(7) SOVIET-FINNISH WAR – WINTER & CONTINUATION WARS

(8) YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WAR & WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

(9) ITALO-ABYSSINIAN WAR / EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

(10) ANGLO-FRENCH WAR

Top Tens – History (WW2): Top 10 Second World Wars (10) Anglo-French War

Attack on Mers-El-Kebir harbor 3 July 1940 by Maxrossomachin for Wikipedia “Attack on Mers-el-Kebir” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

 

(10) ANGLO-FRENCH WAR

(3 JULY 1940 – 10 NOVEMBER 1942)

 

It’s another war that tends to be forgotten or overlooked when it comes to the Second World War, similarly to the Italo-Abyssinian War and East Africa Campaign – perhaps not coincidentally because it was the other war within the Second World War that involved fighting in Africa.

It was also something of a historical throwback but even further back than to the nineteenth century and the Scramble for Africa. Instead, it was throwback to the Anglo-French wars fought from 1689 to 1815 – dubbed the Second Hundred Years War.

Of course, it was a pale shadow of the former Anglo-French rivalry for nothing less than global dominion – evoking the quip of Marx that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Yes, it was fought as part of a war effectively for global dominion – but not so much by Britain or France, and the fighting between them was at the fringes or periphery of the larger war.

Indeed, Britain only fought France to pre-empt Germany (or Japan) – and was mostly limited to fighting France or Italy at the fringes or periphery of its war with Germany because it lacked the ability or means to attack Germany directly. Or as historian H.P. Willmott observed – “In this initial period, Britain, expelled from the continental mainland and unable to carry the war to Germany, was obliged to fight where she could rather than where she would”.

The war was technically not Anglo-French war but Anglo-Vichy war, which effectively was also a civil war between the German puppet Vichy regime in France and the Free French government, contested not in France itself but in – and for control of – the French colonies. With the safety of distance and the lack of strategic importance, most of the French colonies aligned with the Free French – with the significant exceptions of French North Africa and Indochina.

It was also not continuous but sporadic, with fighting isolated to brief campaigns in dispersed locations.

The first of these campaigns was the British naval attack on French navy ships at Mers El Kebir in Algeria on 3 July 1940, “the main part of Operation Catapult, the British plan to neutralize or destroy French naval ships to prevent them falling into German hands” after France surrendered to Germany. That played a large part in Vichy hostility to Britain that saw Germany court the Vichy regime – and Spain – as active allies against Britain in 1940 but fortunately both Vichy France and Spain declined to abandon their neutrality for war against Britain.

On 23 September 1940, Britain and Free French forces under de Gaulle launched Operation Menace to take the Vichy port of Dakar in French West Africa, but withdrew on 25 September 1940 when they met fierce resistance from Vichy forces – the one British defeat in the Anglo-Vichy war.

Otherwise, French colonies in Africa aligned themselves with the Free French, although one colony – French Equatorial Africa or Gabon – had to be occupied by Free French forces with British support in a campaign from 27 October 1940 to 12 November 1940 before the Vichy colonial government surrendered.

From 8 June to 14 July 1941, British and Free French forces fought and won the Syria-Lebanon campaign to capture those Vichy territories, effectively to pre-empt Germany (and Italy) exploiting them against Britain in the Middle East, as with the coup Germany had sponsored in Iraq to install an anti-British regime – which Britain crushed in May 1941.

From 5 May to 6 November 1942, British forces fought the Battle of Madagascar to capture that Vichy territory for Free French control, effectively to pre-empt Japan using it as a base for naval forces to seal off the Indian Ocean – something of a missed opportunity by Japan.

The final campaign in the Anglo-French war – which also included a brief Franco-American war – was of course Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa. The Vichy regime in North Africa initially resisted before by good fortune the Vichy commander Admiral Darlan was captured and effectively defected to the Allies, nominating himself as the leader of French North Africa and West Africa with their forces now on the Allied side. Vichy France itself effectively ceased to exist as Germany now occupied all France, although Germany kept up some semblance of the puppet regime in occupied France and subsequently as government-in-exile in Germany.

The Anglo-French war prompts to mind the snide observations by historian Gerhard Weinberg which he posed as questions for World War Two historians – why Britain was so consistently defeated by German and Japanese forces until the Battle of El Alamein (such that its only consistent victories were against French and Italian forces), and why Vichy France strongly resisted Allied incursions but so readily gave up Germany or Japan without resistance.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)