Top Tens – History: Top 10 Books (Complete Top 10)

Marble bust of Herodotus, the “Father of HIstory” – public domain image donated to Wikimedia Commons as part of a project by the Metropolitan Museum of Art

 

History repeats itself – the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.

History does not repeat but sometimes it rhymes.

History is just one damned thing after another.

Ah yes, history – and three of my favorite quotes about it.

The first is paraphrasing an actual quote by Karl Marx – often overlooked by people, even Marxists, as someone who could be quite the capable prose stylist when not bogged down in denser prose or theory.

The second is often attributed to Mark Twain – someone who is widely acknowledged as a capable prose stylist, except that he doesn’t seem to have actually said it.

The third quip is often quoted from historian Toynbee – correctly but somewhat misleadingly because firstly, it was adapted from a preceding popular saying about life, and secondly, he was using it to criticize historians who simply sought to chronicle history rather than analyze it.

Toynbee definitely fell in the latter category – a historian whose central theme was identifying, well, the themes of history, its cycles and patterns, its plot and rhythm (or history rhyming if you will).

History has been a subject that has fascinated me since childhood, when I read it avidly – and still does as I read it now, hence my Top 10 History Books.

The subject of history in its broadest sense is perhaps straightforward enough – “the systematic study and documentation” of the human past or past events, usually demarcated from prehistory as the past or events subsequent to the invention of writing systems (or written history in other words, although it might be corroborated by other sources such as archaeology).

Beyond that, it gets a little tricky with all the permutations of the various subjects of history or even the concept of history itself – so many permutations that it could be the subject of its own top ten and certainly has been the subject of debate among historians.

“History is an academic discipline which uses a narrative to describe, examine, question, and analyze past events, and investigate their patterns of cause and effect. Historians debate which narrative best explains an event, as well as the significance of different causes and effect. Historians debate the nature of history as an end in itself, and its usefulness in giving perspective on the problems of the present.”

I’m not here to seek to resolve any of these debates, if such a thing is even possible – I’m just here to read books on history and, you know, live in it. To adapt my own quote of living in a mythic world, I live in a historic world. We all do.

That said, what I will do is clarify my tastes in history books. I definitely lean more towards Toynbee’s concept of history as themes or patterns, preferring history books that are more analysis than chronicle. All my top ten might be said to be analytical or thematic history, albeit some more than others.

I also tend to prefer my thematic history on a grand scale – the scale of comparative or global history. Not always of course, but often – it is a preference after all, characterizing at least six of my top ten books.

I also tend to have a preference for military history – put bluntly, the history of wars and empires, or indeed of war and empire in the general thematic sense. The latter characterizes two of my top ten books as general histories of war and warfare.

Following on from the history of wars and empires, it might be cliched but foremost among my subjects of preference are the Roman Empire and the Second World War (although Alexander the Great and the Cold War are close – and somewhat overlapping – runners-up for each respectively). Two of my top ten books have their subject as a focus on the Roman Empire, while another two are with respect to the Second World War.

I also can’t invoke capable prose style in my introduction without noting my preference for a good or even literary prose style in my books of history – some historians or historical writers are definitely better than others.

So here are my top ten books of history. You know the rules – this is one of my deep dive top tens, counting down from tenth to first place and looking at individual entries in some depth or detail of themselves. Tenth place is my wildcard entry for the best entry from the previous year (2023).

But wait – there’s more! The subject is prolific enough for my usual twenty special mentions per top ten and for honorable mentions beyond that.

 

 

(10) ANTHONY KALDELLIS –

THE NEW ROMAN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF BYZANTIUM (2023)

 

 

My wildcard tenth place entry as best history book of 2023 is this history of the eastern Roman Empire – from founding to fall of Constantinople, with more than a millennium of history in between them.

 

By the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 AD– on the threshold of the Spanish discovery of the Americas and marking the start of the early modern period – the empire was effectively reduced to the city itself with some spare change left behind in the couch in the Peloponnese.

 

It had come a long way – and fallen so far – from its glorious founding as new imperial capital from the former city of Byzantium by Constantine in 330 AD, reigning as sole emperor over the whole classical Roman empire. From that point the empire was almost inevitably destined to be divided (again) into western and eastern halves, with the latter ruled from Constantinople and almost inevitably destined to outlast the former.

 

The founding of Constantinople and its rule over the eastern empire that became the sole empire once its western counterpart fell prompts consideration of what to call that empire, which is addressed from the outset of the book – and in its title.

 

It was of course, as they considered themselves to be, the continuation of the Roman Empire, but it also had important distinctions from the former classical empire – distinctions that allowed it to endure as long as it did and not merely as a “pale facsimile of classical Rome” but “a vigorous state of its own, inheritor of many of Rome’s features, and a vital node in the first truly globalized world”.

 

Western history has borrowed from Constantinople’s former title Byzantium – as indeed does the book’s subtitle and its author as self-described Byzantist – to call it the Byzantine empire, often to the detriment of the empire’s continuity with the Roman Empire. I guess Constantinopolitan Empire doesn’t exactly roll off the tongue.

 

That is something which this book resists, advocating persuasively against that usage. While it is no doubt a term with an unfortunate history of usage, much like the general usage of Byzantine as a pejorative adjective, I think the title of Byzantine Empire may well be too ingrained in common usage to shake.

 

The common alternative has been to call it the Eastern Roman Empire – a usage similar to that of various Chinese dynasties to distinguish their geographical extent at different times, such as the Southern Song dynasty.

 

The book makes a persuasive case for a title as the New Roman Empire but then doesn’t really use that beyond the book’s title and introduction, instead preferring to use Romania – a usage that I don’t think will catch on for potential confusion with the modern nation of that name. Also come on – neo-Roman Empire was right there!

 

As for the book’s history of that thousand-year empire, it’s pretty much summed up by that earlier quote about it as a “vigorous state of its own” – one which endured through “innovative institutions and a bottomless strategic playbook”, the latter including what in modern parlance is called soft power and set out in one of the book’s many engaging points.

 

Another engaging point is that the book plays into my preference for thematic history, not simply chronicling what happened but asking how and why it did – above all, the question of how and why the empire “lasted so long lies at the heart of the book”.

 

That can be broken down into further questions, which the book engages. How and why did it survive when the western empire didn’t? How and why did it almost succumb to enemies after that, notably the Persians and Arabs when it came within a heartbeat of falling? How and why did it then rebound after those and other occasions of decline?

 

As to the book’s big question of how and why it lasted so long, a fundamental part of the answer is reflected in its preferred usage of Romania – that the empire transformed itself to resemble not so much subjects under imperial rule as participants in a Roman nation state.

 

A further engaging point is that the author doesn’t shrink on occasion from laying down some snide snark – such as when channelling his inner Procopius, he lets the occasional barb slip that he really doesn’t like Justinian. He quips that the Plague of Justinian was the only thing the emperor didn’t want to name after himself – ooo, sick imperial burn! Of course, in this house, Justinian is a hero – although even I have to admit he overextended the empire.

 

Less engaging for me is when he detours into the endless theological disputes in the broader history of Christianity within the empire. Yes, yes – I know the history of the empire is intimately caught up with the history of Christianity within it but my eyes mostly glazed over when the book went there.

 

Except for the dispute over icons – that kept my interest, although I suppose it helped it just involved the simply use (or prohibition from use) of images and not some mindbogglingly pedantic semantics. Also, there was the book’s insight that the iconoclasts were not as, well, iconoclastic as they were made out to be.

 

Even so, I preferred the book’s more straightforward political and military history of when the empire was kicking ass or having its ass kicked.

 

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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Cover – 2010 Yale University Press edition

 

(9) ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY –

HOW ROME FELL: DEATH OF A SUPERPOWER (2009)

 

 

Adrian Goldsworthy has risen to the status of my favorite historian of the classical Roman empire, mostly on the back of this book although his 2023 book The Eagle and the Lion: Rome, Persia and an Unwinnable Conflict was a leading contender for my wildcard tenth place entry for best history book of 2023.

 

I’ve used the American title for the book because I prefer it as more catchy – and it also prompts to mind one of my personal highlights of the book in its introduction, dismissing the cliché of comparing the decline and fall of the Roman Empire to the modern United States (a cliché with which Goldsworthy entertainingly relates that he is routinely accosted at dinner parties when he informs someone of his historical speciality).

 

As to the question in the book’s title, in a nutshell Goldsworthy answers that they did it to themselves. It’s a little like the twist in Fight Club, with the Romans revealed as the protagonist beating himself up, to the bemusement of the barbarian onlookers – and their delight when picking up the pieces.

 

I think it’s a solid answer. Goldsworthy does not dismiss the various barbarian invasions as the reason for the empire’s demise but that looks to the question of how they did so, given that the empire’s adversaries were not fundamentally different from when the empire successfully resisted them – and in the case of the various German tribes, so surprisingly small compared to the empire.

 

As Goldsworthy memorably observes, no matter who won their seemingly endless civil wars or wars of imperial succession, the losses were all Roman, weakening the empire as a whole against its external adversaries. Another memorable observation is how the Romans never really left the crisis of the third century, just muted it to fewer civil wars and usurpations.

 

Also, the Romans ultimately played a losing game enlisting German tribes as allies or foederati in its own territory – in that the territory occupied by the Germans was no longer Roman territory, with the Romans losing any revenue from those territories, or any manpower beyond that provided by the Germans. Thanks a lot, Theodosius – you empire killer.

 

As for the history itself, Goldsworthy takes the same starting point as that of Gibbon’s famous History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire – itself following on from Roman historian Cassius Dio who marked it as their descent from “a kingdom of gold to one of rust and iron” – the death of Marcus Aurelius and accession of Commodus in 180 AD.

 

However, he pulls up stumps well before Gibbon’s finishing point, wrapping up the book aptly enough with the reign of Heraclius and the empire’s territory lost to the Arabs.

 

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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Cover 2002 Free Press edition

 

(8) FELIPPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO –

CIVILIZATIONS: CULTURE, AMBITION & THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE (2000)

 

A book on the suject of human civilization – or rather, civilizations, arranged by environment, consistent with the definition of civilization in the subtitle as the transformation of nature.

The book essentially treats all human societies as civilization, or at least a civilization – eschewing attempts at ‘checklist’ of criteria that define a civilization, given the problems of previous attempts to do so for any that are universally agreed, instead looking at human societies in classic Toynbee terms of challenge and response to their natural environments, at least in origin.

While such an approach may have flaws in its lack of distinction between a ‘civilization’ and other human societies, the book does have much to offer from its thematic history of human civilization from a geographic and environmental perspective.

Firstly, it vividly impresses on you the extent to which human history and societies have been shaped by nature, at least in origin – including the most basic or stark features which one might otherwise overlook from a different thematic perspective.

This is most striking when it looks at those environments it groups together as the wasteland, worlds of ice or sand deserts, which can only support the most minimalist societies – minimalist that is, beyond surviving in them, prompting to mind the lines from the poem “Australia” by A.D. Hope, about men whose boast is not “we live” but “we survive”. There’s a similar quality

Perhaps its most insightful feature – which it states in its introduction – was its comparative history of civilizations, “arranged environment by environment, rather than period by period or society by society”, thus yielding comparisons across time and space that might not otherwise occur to the reader.

The evocative part and chapter headings (or subheadings) illustrate those environmental classifications:

  • Part 1: The Wasteland – Ice Worlds & Tundra, Deserts of Sand
  • Part 2: Leave of Grass – Prairie & Grassy Savannah, the Eurasian Steppe (the Highway of Civilization)
  • Part 3: Under the Rain – Postglacial & Temperate Woodland, Tropical Lowlands
  • Part 4: The Shining Fields of Mud (alluvial or river floodplains in the ancient Near East, China and India)
  • Part 5: The Mirrors of Sky – the Highland Civilizations of the New World and the Old
  • Part 6: The Water Margins (Civilizations Shaped by the Sea) – Small Island Civilizations and Seaboard Civilizations such as the Seaboard Civilizations of Maritime Asia or the Greek and Roman Seaboards
  • Part 7: Breaking the Waves (the Domestication of the Oceans) – the Rise of Oceanic Civilizations, the Making of Atlantic Civilization, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific – from the Pacific to the World

I was particularly fascinated by its comparison of grassland societies – prompting to mind, as such things tend to do, whether other grasslands might have produced the horse blitzkriegs that the Eurasian steppes did in other circumstances.

Or its subject of the oceans – how maritime navigation has been shaped by the distinctive currents and wind patterns of each ocean, with the Indian Ocean proving the most ”precocious’ for long distance navigation (indeed from the dawn of human history), the Atlantic being somewhat more tricky, and the Pacific trickier still (Polynesian island-hopping aside).

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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Cover as published by Viking 1990

 

(7) JOHN ELLIS –

BRUTE FORCE: ALLIED STRATEGY & TACTICS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1990)

 

Quantity has a quality all of its own.

Stalin is reputed to have said this, aptly enough about the Soviet armed forces in the Second World War. It’s probably apocryphal but I like to think that the fact it and other zingers are attributed to him implies an ability to drop one-liners unparalleled by any other war leader than Churchill – and certainly far exceeding Hitler. It amuses me to think that above all else, the Allies won the war of one-liners, the most important war of all. In modern internet parlance, you might say the Axis couldn’t meme.

More relevantly, if you were to sum up this book’s theme and thesis in one line, Stalin’s would do nicely, except that for both his Soviet forces and those of the Allies, it was a somewhat poor quality – the brute force of the title, grinding to a slower and more costly victory than might otherwise have been the case. In other words, war by attrition – and often not too different from the bloody attrition of the First World War for which that conflict’s military leadership is often faulted.

I obviously like Ellis as a historian – his Social History of the Machine Gun was similarly illuminating and insightful – although sadly his books seem somewhat neglected these days and can be elusive to find.

This book remains my favorite by Ellis – as well as one of my favorite general or thematic histories of the Second World War, exceeded only by my entry in top spot, which might arguably be paired together as alternatives (or correctives) to each other.

It certainly was an eye-opening look at Allied strategy and tactics in the war – and his critiques of their lack of finesse, proficiency or skill are persuasive, as for example with RAF Marshal Sir Arthur Harris’ area bombing dogma, a common subject of historical (and moral) criticism.

On the other hand, such critiques are easy to overstate in hindsight, particularly as opposed to the contemporary reality where each theater competed with the others, demanding troops and resources in very different ways and that could not be used elsewhere – or planning or production line decisions well in advance but which took substantial periods of time to change to battlefield requirements.

As opposed to my top spot entry (as something of an antidote), the book does lean into a historical pet peeve of mine – that tendency, dubbed in some internet circles as ‘wehraboo’ (a play on Wehrmacht and ‘weeaboo’ as slang for excessive or obsessive anime fandom), to disparage the Allies compared to so-called German military ‘excellence”.

While I would accept arguments that the Germans were the most consistent in their tactical proficiency throughout the war, albeit not so much in their strategy, much of the critiques Ellis makes about Allied “brute force” might also be made about German military successes.

In fairness, Ellis does make much of the same critiques about the Germans, particularly as the wheels started to fall off their blitzkrieg. However, the book overlooks the extent to which initial German successes relied not just on good luck and timing in a somewhat narrow window of opportunity, but also on significant advantages over their adversaries at the outset – advantages which arguably weren’t effectively matched by the comparable advantages in manpower and materiel by the Allies against them until 1944, at which point the Germans collapsed in a rapid manner similar to their own initial adversaries.

It also overlooks that the Germans owed their endurance in defense, at least in part, to the improvements in defensive firepower from that at the outset of the war, as well as their undoubted tactical proficiency in defense that enabled them to outfight numerically superior enemies until 1944.

I also took away from the book something else from the “brute force” of its title about Allied superiority – just how foolhardy the three major Axis nations in general were and Germany in particular was to decide on war in the first place, resembling nothing so much as a twentieth century version of the ghost dance seeking to conjure victory out of “triumph of the will”.

Germany and Japan even sought to make a virtue out of necessity by vaunting their so-called martial and psychological superiority over the material strength of their adversaries. History generally has a name for nations that do so – losers.

It also overlooks that Allied superiority was hard-earned. Material strength doesn’t just, well, materialize but takes a very real achievement in mobilizing manpower and materiel – one in which the Allies massively outclassed the Axis and one which is highlighted further by the fact that Germany had managed to occupy a productive potential in Europe to rival the United States but was still massively out-produced by the latter.

Italy is often disparaged for its performance in the war, particularly compared to Germany, but the underlying reality was not too different between them, albeit kept at bay for longer by Germany’s greater industrial base and tactical proficiency – such that I like to adapt the late Cold War quip about the Soviet Union being “Upper Volta with rockets” to Germany being “Italy with rockets”, in a very literal sense.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(6) J.M. ROBERTS –

THE TRIUMPH OF THE WEST: THE ORIGIN, RISE & LEGACY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1985)

 

Greatly expanded from the BBC TV series he presented of the same title, this book similarly looks at what is Western civilization and its titular ambigous triumph.

Roberts was a classic old school British historian – and by old school I mean Oxford, ultimately returning to his alma mater as Warden of Merton College, an academic title like many others that evoke those of a fantasy novel.

Apart from his academic distinctions, he had many published works for which he was hailed as “a master of the broad brush-stroke” – or in other words that thematic style of history which is my favorite.

That style is on display in what I regard to be the crowning achievement of any historian – a history of the world, particularly if it also spans all of history, as Roberts did with his History of the World published by Penguin (usually as the Penguin History of the World).

Given the scale, it’s obviously not light reading – but is demonstrative of Roberts’ style that pithy phrases from it still resonate in my mind many years after reading it. Roberts evoking most modern wars in the Middle East as the wars of Ottoman succession for example, or Romanticism as a secularized Protestantism.

Roberts’ style and mastery of broad brush strokes is even more on display in The Triumph of the West, perhaps not surprisingly given its origin in the television series he wrote and presented (for which prose style and mastery of broad brush strokes are effectively sine qua non for engaging an audience) as well as its shorter volume than his world history.

The chapters – corresponding to the episodes of the TV series – effectively showcase its presentation of “the origins and evolution of Western civilization, and the transformative challenges and influence it has exerted on the rest of the world”:

  • 1 – One World (TV episode – Dangerous Gifts: the benefits and costs of Western influence)
  • 2 – A Sense of Direction (TV episode – A New Direction: Influences from Ancient Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian Culture)
  • 3 – Birth of the West (TV episode – The Heart of the West: The Middle Ages and Orbis Christiani)
  • 4 – The World’s Debate (TV episode – The World’s Debate: Islam and Christianity)
  • 5 – Defining a World (TV episode – East of Europe: Byzantium and Russia)
  • 6 – An Exploring Civilization (TV episode – The Age of Exploration)
  • 7 – New Worlds (TV episode – same)
  • 8 – A New Age (TV episode – Age of Light)
  • 9 – History Speeds Up (TV episode – Monuments to Progress: The Long Nineteenth Century)
  • 10 – The Confident Aggressors (TV episode – India: The Ironies of Empire)
  • 11 – Responses and Repercussions (TV episode – The East is Red: China in the Twentieth Century)
  • 12 – A Sense of Decline (TV episode – The Decline of the West :Two World Wars and The Great Depression)
  • 13 – A Post-Western World? (TV episode – Capitulations: Third World countries learn the price of dependency on the West)

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(5) GEOFFREY BLAINEY –

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD (2000)

 

“The most prolific, wide-ranging, inventive, and, in the 1980s and 1990s, most controversial of Australia’s living historians” – that last epithet was for his commentary on public affairs, so naturally I like him.

Geoffrey Blainey is Australia’s leading historian – and the leading historian of Australia itself, coining the definitive phrase for that history in the famous title of his book The Tyranny of Distance.

Wide-ranging indeed – upon graduating, Blainey initially eschewed academia for the private sector as a freelance historian, studying and writing the history of a mining and railway company in Tasmania.

He subsequently ranged through Australian history, with a focus on thematic history “organized around the exploration of the impact of the single factor (distance, mining, pre-settlement Aboriginal society)”.

Of particular interest to me, his range extended to the “rhythms” of global history – “two centuries of conflict in The Causes of War (1973)”, “examining the optimism and pessimism in Western society since 1750 in The Great See-Saw”, the history of Christianity, and the “tempestuous” 20th century.

And of course this book – which with my interest in global history I tend to regard as his magnum opus, apologies to The Tyranny of Distance.

What distinguishes Blainey in my eyes, both generally and in his book, is his eye for theme – especially themes outside the usual political or military history to which history is slanted, particularly global history.

A single volume history of the world must necessarily be compact yet Blainey not only achieves this but also seamlessly works in chapters on themes that elude other such histories.

For example, a chapter on the historical impact of the night sky on humanity. Or a chapter on the conquest of night by artificial lighting. Or of time itself by mechanical clocks in western civilization.

Or such resonant images or phrases that stick in the mind like Venice as the Silicon Valley of Renaissance Italy – through its glass-making as the cutting edge of technological innovation such as lenses for telescopes or microscopes, which I’m tempted to add to the conquest of time and night as the conquest of light.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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(4) PAUL JOHNSON –

MODERN TIMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1980S (1983)

 

“A latter day Mencken, Johnson is witty, gritty, and compulsively readable”.

 

Probably the most divisive entry in my top ten, in part because Johnson is the sole entry without a background as an academic historian (possibly except Ellis for whom I’m unable to find any biographical detail) – except perhaps for undergraduate study.

 

Instead, Johnson was a journalist and popular historian – although it makes you sit up and pay attention when you read that as a journalist he interviewed some of the historical figures in this book, as for example he states in a footnote he did with Kerensky (obviously in the latter’s exile as former leader of the Provisional Government of Russia overthrown by the Bolsheviks).

 

In part that explains the divisive nature of this entry – but perhaps mostly it’s the strength of his opinions and the prose style with which he expressed them, both of which (as well as that divisive nature) were reflected in this book.

.

Yes, yes – I know this book has been updated and reissued with various subtitles to reflect that (such as the one in my feature image) but I’m going with the original title.

 

It was the first book of history that I read from Johnson although afterwards I avidly read others by him as it was a huge influence on me in my youth. Not so much now as I’ve receded somewhat from him as I’ve perceived some of his more idiosyncratic opinions, albeit I still rank him highly enough for this entry.

 

For example, I can agree with his assessment of Eisenhower as the twentieth century’s most successful president (although he also ranks Reagan highly, perhaps even higher in the later editions) but not so much some of the other presidents he ranked highly (or badly). Sorry, I will never see Nixon as anything but crooked, even if he demonstrated a certain amoral competence.

 

From the above one may divine his opinions to be conservative, of a distinctly Catholic and anti-communist kind – interestingly enough as he originally was left-wing before his ideological reversal on the road to Damascus, a metaphor I think he would have particularly liked given his beliefs and name.

 

Whatever one may think of his opinions, the virtuosity of his prose style was undeniable – perhaps the best of any of my top ten entries, with a particular talent for turns of phrase and chapter titles, as illustrated by those for this book:

 

1 – A Relativistic World

2 – The First Despotic Utopias

3 – Waiting for Hitler

4 – Legitimacy in Decadence

5 – An Infernal Theocracy, a Celestial Chaos

6 – The Last Arcadia

7 – Degringolade

8 – The Devils

9 – The High Noon of Aggression

10 – The End of Old Europe

11 – The Watershed Year

12 – Superpower and Genocide

13 – Peace by Terror

14 – The Bandung Generation

15 – Caliban’s Kingdoms

16 – Experimenting with Half Mankind

17 – The European Lazarus

18 – America’s Suicide Attempt

19 – The Collectivist Seventies

20 – The Recovery of Freedom (in later editions – formerly Palimpsests of Freedom)

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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Oxford University Press, 1st edition (paperback) cover 2008

 

(3) AZAR GAT –

WAR IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION (2006)

 

 

“War, huh, yeah

What is it good for?”

 

Azar Gat’s history of war in human civilization is nothing short of magisterial – and at least halfway answers that famous song lyric, telling us what war is for.

 

That is the fundamental question which this book examines – “Why do people go to war?”.

 

Is it part of human nature or a “late cultural invention” of “civilization”, linked to agriculture, the state or something else? In short, who was right – Hobbes or Rousseau?

 

Has war declined in modernity? If so, why?

 

“In this truly global study of war and civilization, Azar Gat sets out to find definitive answers to these questions in an attempt to unravel the ‘riddle of war’ throughout human history, from the early hunter-gatherers right through to the unconventional terrorism of the twenty-first century”.

 

The book is divided into three parts. Part 2 – titled Agriculture, Civilization, and War – is perhaps the most straightforward of the three, although the overarching question of why people go to war is still present throughout, along with the associated question of how they do. Although he gave the game away in Part 1, Gat definitely leans into Hobbes here, with the emergence of strong central states – Hobbes’ Leviathan – being a key reason for less violent societies. Yes – even when those states make a wasteland and call it peace, as with the Roman Empire and their Pax Romana. He indicates as much with the title of his conclusion for this part – War, the Leviathan, and the Pleasures and Miseries of Civilization.

 

However, Parts 1 and 3 were the most fascinating for me. Part 1 and its sweeping title Warfare in the First Two Million Years indicate that its gamut is the whole of human prehistory – and indeed earlier to hominid or primate prehistory. One myth that Gat dispels in Part 1 is that humans are uniquely prolific for intra-species violence. As Gat demonstrates, they are not – and indeed other animal species match or exceed humans for violence within their own species. Where humans differ is with respect to the targets of their violence. Whereas animals avoid more costly violence against evenly matched males and instead target young or females of their own species (as with the infamous example of male lions killing cubs when they take over a pride), humans are the opposite – targeting other males, often with the express motive of taking women and children as prizes. But you might ask – aren’t human males similarly evenly matched as their animal counterparts? Yes, indeed – which is why humans make it less evenly matched by the preferred strategies of the ambush or raid catching antagonists by surprise, ideally asleep, something which is easier to do for humans than for animals.

 

Which brings us to the other myth Gat dispels in this part – Rousseau’s “noble savage” or rather the myth of a peaceful ‘savage’, where the true escalation of violence in war arising with ‘civilization’, whether agriculture, the state, or something else. Indeed, Gat demonstrates that humans in their “state of nature” or indeed in societies not predominated by powerful central states experience much more violence, usually by substantial orders of magnitude.

 

As for Part 3 – Modernity: The Dual Face of Janus – Gat demonstrates that modernity has resulted in, well, more peace and less violence or war, even if that does not seem to be the case because of the destructive power of our technology. More intriguingly, Gat dispels (or at least introduces cause for caution with respect to) any monomythic explanations for this – such as “democratic peace theory” or fear of nuclear weapons.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

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(2) JOHN KEEGAN –

A HISTORY OF WARFARE (1993)

 

The magnum opus of one of the foremost military historians of our time – a global history of war from prehistory to nuclear weapons. (Although one might also argue his magnum opus was his trilogy of The Face of Battle, The Mask of Command, and The Price of Admiralty).

 

After an introductory section “War in Human History”, Keegan organizes his history in broad thematic sections invoking the four classical elements but as the four elements of war, albeit also more or less in chronological sequence – “Stone”, “Flesh”, “Iron” and “Fire”.

 

Between each section is an “interlude”, not so much in chronological sequence but with a focus on recurring aspects – or problems – throughout the history of warfare, respectively limitations on warmaking, fortification, armies, and logistics and supply. For example, the interlude on ärmies dealt with the basic problem of – and limited number of means for – actually raising armies.

 

The titles of those elemental sections speak for themselves – with fire obviously corresponding to the defining characteristic of modern warfare increasingly relying on forms of combustion or energy, from gunpower through the internal combustion engine to nuclear weapons.

 

A personal highlight was the book’s examination of the conquests of the various “horse peoples”, the high point of which were the Mongols, always a subject of fascination for me. Something that has always resonated in my mind ever since is Keegan’s opinion that much of the mobile tactical skill of the horse peoples originated in the same techniques they used on their herds except on their adversaries instead.

 

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

Raising the flag over the Reichstag – one of the most iconic images of WW2 (as photographed by Yevgeny Khaldei and in public domain), used for the cover of the first edition of the book (and also for its own article on Wikipedia “Raising a flag over the Reichstag”)

 

(1) HP WILLMOTT –

THE GREAT CRUSADE: A NEW COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1989)

 

The best single “volume history of the Second World War in its coverage of all the major themes and all the fronts”.

And for that matter, as you can tell by my placement of it in first place, my favorite volume of history for any subject – the one most firmly embedded in my psyche and the one to which I return the most, particularly on the subject of WW2, with insights or nuggets on almost every page.

For example, comparing the Pacific War to the American Civil War, with the former having uncanny parallels to the latter, even down to the two main American (or Union) offensive directions of each, with Imperial Japan similarly doomed to defeat as the Confederacy and for much the same reasons.

Or the transposition between Germany and the Soviet Union in military proficiency, such that by 1944-1945 the latter arguably equalled or surpassed the former at its peak, while Germany matched many of the same failings for the Soviets back in 1941.

Indeed, most of my own views of the Second World War originate in this book. Much of that is due to the style of Willmott, a strangely neglected or overlooked military historian – to quote excerpts from an Amazon review:

“Interesting, insightful, revelatory…Willmott is Willmott: never less than lucid and coherent, even when his work descends into the “mere chronicle” of army, corps and divisional movements that more properly belong to purely military history…magisterial is no more than an appropriate term with which to describe Willmott’s informative – indeed, transformative – and succinctly and clearly expressed synthesis of the knowledge on such a wide subject.”

Above all, my view of the Second World War originates in Willmott’s main theme or thesis of the book, which he was nice enough to state at the outset – debunking the myth of German military excellence. Indeed, he cheekily adapts Oscar Wilde’s famous quote from The Importance of Being Earnest – to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness

This might seem paradoxical given the extent of Germany’s initial victories – and the Allied effort required to reverse those victories and defeat Germany – but almost as paradoxically, Willmott argues this just illustrates his theme, that Germany could succeed to that extent but still lose.

However, the paradox is resolved by Willmott’s argument, which he repeatedly demonstrates throughout the book, that “the German military genius was in fighting not in war, and along with her Japanese ally Germany was the only great power that did not understand the nature of war.”

One might add that this is the converse of the art of war, at least according to Sun Tzu – and of the Allies in general and the United States in particular. As Willmott observes, in terms of actually waging war, Germany was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies, matched only by the similar hopelessness of their ally Japan.

Willmott has yet another striking insight in his speculation about the reason for this – that the very success of Bismarck, the one German leader who had understood war, that is the limits of military and national power, “blinded successive generations of Germans to these realities because they saw only his military victories”.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

HISTORY: TOP 10 BOOKS

(TIER LIST)

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

(1) H.P.WILLMOTT – THE GREAT CRUSADE

(2) JOHN KEEGAN – A HISTORY OF WARFARE

(3) AZAR GAT – WAR IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION

 

Yes – it’s my holy trinity of military history. If H.P. Willmott is my Old Testament of books of history, then John Keegan and Azar Gat are my New Testament.

 

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

(4) PAUL JOHNSON – MODERN TIMES

(5) GEOFFREY BLAINEY – A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD

(6) J.M. ROBERTS – TRIUMPH OF THE WEST

(7) JOHN ELLIS – BRUTE FORCE

(8) FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO – CIVILIZATIONS

(9) ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY – HOW ROME FELL

 

X-TIER (WILD TIER) – BEST OF 2023

 

(10) ANTHONY KALDELLIS – THE NEW ROMAN EMPIRE

Top Tens – History (Rome): Top 10 Roman Empires (1) Roman Empire

 

The Roman Empire under Trajan 117 AD – by Tataryn for Wikipedia “Roman Empire” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

(1) ROMAN EMPIRE

(27 BC – 330 / 395 / 476 AD)

There it is – Roman Empire original recipe. Why’d you have to go and mess with the classics?

But of course you must have been expecting this – that in a list of Top 10 Roman Empires, THE Roman Empire would rank on top. By Roman Empire, I mean the ‘classical’ Roman Empire – what most people think of as the Roman Empire.

Of course, it’s not the whole of the Roman Empire – as I did for the Roman Empire in top spot in my Top 10 Empires, spanning from the legendary founding of Rome to the fall of Constantinople. However, as I stated in my introduction, this top ten is essentially my Roman Empire iceberg, in which I look at different permutations of the empire beneath the surface of that span or fundamental continuity, becoming more remote or wild breakaway or vestigial states the deeper we go.

Usually the classical Roman Empire is at least what historians have termed the Principate or the empire founded by Augustus from the Roman Republic in 27 BC, essentially by making as little fuss as possible about it being an empire with himself as emperor, although his successors made a lot more fuss about it. Generally, it also extends to what historians term the Dominate, the empire as reformed by Diocletian, anywhere from the start of his reign in 284 AD onwards.

As to where it ends, there are a number of points of demarcation, typically from the division of empire into its western and eastern imperial halves – as defined by Constantine founding Constantinople as the capital of the eastern empire in 330 AD, more usually when the division of imperial administration became permanent in 395 AD, or when the western empire fell (or more precisely, the last western emperor was deposed) in 476 AD. Of course, one can simply continue on with the eastern Roman empire to its fall in 1453, or perhaps some earlier point to mark the transition of the empire from ‘classical Roman empire’ to ‘medieval Greek empire’, typically either the end of the reign of Justinian in 565 AD or that of Heraclius in 641 AD.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Empires (Special Mention) (2) Russian & Soviet Empires

Russian Empire by Milenioscuro for Wikipedia “Russian Empire” licensed under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

(2) RUSSIAN & SOVIET EMPIRES

 

Bizarro European empire and third largest empire by size in history, such that even the residual state of Russia remains the largest nation in the world.

Why bizarro European empire? Well, for one thing, as J.M. Roberts pointed out in Triumph of the West, it’s always been unclear where the West ends going east – and in particular on which side of the line of Western civilization the Russian state falls.

For another, the Russian Empire was distinct from other European empires, but ironically its closest parallel is with the United States, albeit still weirdly so, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed when he presciently predicted them – in 1835! – as the future global powers on parallel but opposing paths:

“There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.

All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the obstacles which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its arms. The conquests of the American are therefore gained with the ploughshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.”

The primary distinction with other European empires was that, with one notable exception, the Russian Empire was not a maritime empire. Indeed, it was famously landlocked, with an equally famous strategic policy of seeking unobstructed warm-water ports.

Instead, it was a good old-fashioned territorial empire, expanding eastwards from European Russia across Siberia and central Asia, hence its parallel with the United States and its westward ‘manifest destiny’ or territorial expansion (in both cases to the Pacific).

Unlike the United States, it had more arguable justification in terms of its security against historical invasions of nomadic tribe from the steppes, most famously the Mongols – but like the United States (and unlike European maritime empires), it absorbed and retained its territorial conquests or expansion into itself as a nation.

Ultimately, the Russian empire’s eastward expansion brought it to the Pacific Ocean but more fundamentally, to the borders of an Asian state armed with firearms and robust enough to resist it – Qing China, in its prime and powerful enough to defeat Russia in the Sino-Russian border conflicts of the seventeenth century.

Of course, Qing China famously waned in the nineteenth century, while Russia had grown stronger such that it was again able to make encroachments eastwards, but was confronted by Britain and the new rising power in north-east Asia – Japan.

However the Pacific saw that one notable exception for Russia’s maritime empire – as a latecomer in the first phase of European imperialism in the Americas, most famously claiming Alaska (equally famously bought from them by the United States in 1867) but also extending to California and even Hawaii before receding back.

The Russian Empire also expanded southwards through central Asia, but was again blocked by Britain in the so-called Great Game, as well as more regional empires such as the Ottoman Empire. That saw the southernmost extent of the Russian Empire, which did not scramble for Africa like other European empires and was constrained by its naval limitations from extending elsewhere in Asia.

It also expanded westwards into Europe itself, taking Finland from a waning Sweden and partitioning territory (with Prussia and Austria) from the waning Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Despite all this, the Russian imperial state came crashing down like the three other great imperial states of Europe brought down by the First World War – Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire – but more dramatically or spectacularly as it was succeeded by the world’s first communist state, the Soviet Union.

As a communist state, the Soviet Union styled itself as anti-imperialist, but ironically closely emulated or even exceeded the imperialism of its predecessor – arguably in the tradition of two other states that styled themselves as anti-imperialist as they created empires of their own, the United States and Japan.

Initially Soviet imperialism was limited within the former Russian empire itself, but with its rise to superpower escalated to reclaiming its predecessor’s lost territory and then to extending further than the Russian empire ever did, except across the Pacific to the Americas – starting westward to the heart of Europe with its subject satellite states after the Second World War, opposed by the United States in the Cold War, fulfilling de Tocqueville’s prediction.

It also renewed the Russian sphere of influence in north-east Asia, although that fell afoul of a resurgent China, ironically a rival communist state originally within (and a product of) that influence.

The most dramatic success of Soviet imperialism was when it graduated from the traditional territorial empire of its predecessor to the maritime empire of European empires, ironically as those empires were scrambling out of Africa and elsewhere – indeed expanding its influence under its continued anti-imperial guise of supporting decolonization or ‘liberation’ movements from those empires, with overlapping successes in Cuba, south-east Asia and Africa.

Despite all this – and accelerated by one imperial expedition too many into Afghanistan – the Soviet state came crashing down in the end of the Cold War, but not before President Reagan had famously characterized it as the “evil empire”, an epithet much relished by its east European subjects who in turn revolted against it in its death throes.

RATING: 5 STARS*****
S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History (Rome): Top 10 Roman Empires

 

A Roman Legion (from Trajan’s Column), from “Speculum Romanae Magnificentiae” (The Mirror of Roman Magnificence) – public domain image, Metropolitan Museum of Art

 

Roma Eterna!

At the time of writing this, a meme from social media has come to the attention of mainstream media that men think about the Roman Empire a lot (from the viral trend of asking how often they did).

It reminds me of that old anecdote (of dubious authenticity) that the average male thinks of sex one in every seven seconds, which always begged the question to me of what all those other males were thinking about in those other seconds. Well, I guess we know the answer now.

So given its enduring topicality, I thought I’d compile my Top 10 Roman Empires.

Wait – what? Top 10 Roman…Empires? Plural?! Wasn’t there only the one Roman Empire?

Well, yes – except perhaps when there wasn’t.

My tongue is (mostly) in my cheek, but there has been a tendency to demarcate the Roman Empire into different parts, even while maintaining the fundamental continuity between those parts.

The foremost demarcation is the division of the Roman Empire into its western and eastern halves, reflecting the empire’s own division of imperial administration, with the latter enduring for a millennium after the fall of the former but which was named retrospectively by historiographical convention as the Byzantine Empire to distinguish it from being the direct continuation of the Roman Empire.

For that matter, the ‘classical’ Roman Empire is sometimes demarcated into two parts, the Principate to describe the empire instituted by Augustus in 27 BC, and the Dominate to describe the empire as reformed under Diocletian in 284 AD – the latter ultimately overlapping with the division of imperial administration into western and eastern halves.

The eastern Roman Empire is similarly often demarcated into two parts – its original ‘Latin’ empire (literally by its official imperial language) and its transition to its ‘Greek’ empire from the seventh century or so.

One could also parse either the ‘classical’ Roman empire or eastern Roman Empire further by imperial dynasty (or periods when there was no dynasty).

This top ten mostly won’t be concerned with such academic divisions, but don’t be surprised if those eastern and western divisions feature prominently. Rather, it will be concerned with the exceptions to the rule of the Roman Empire – the various breakaway or vestigial states that were either substantial claimants to the Roman Empire or usurping it. Indeed, you could think of it as my Roman Empire iceberg meme – in this case my iceberg of Roman Empire continuity.

Hence I won’t be doing my usual top ten countdown but just counting them out, mostly in chronological order albeit with some exceptions. The top three entries are all within the fundamental continuity of the Roman Empire as the iceberg above the surface, with the subsequent entries as the iceberg beneath the surface becoming more remote or wild breakaway or vestigial states. Don’t worry – I’ll have even wilder entries in my special mentions as we follow the iceberg all the way down claimants to the succession of the Roman Empire.

Note that reference to substantial – arguably the various breakaway states or claimants might extend to any territory controlled by any rivals or usurpers to the imperial throne but let’s not go crazy here. It’s not like we’re just any with delusions of imperial grandeur in the Crisis of Third Century or something. This top ten must have some standards beyond the local barracks emperor.

So that said, these are my Top 10 Roman Empires…

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Empires (Special Mention) (1) European Empires

 

Diachronic map of the main empires of the modern era (1492-1945) – by Nagihuan for Wikipedia “Colonial Empires” under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Declaration

 

(1) EUROPEAN EMPIRES

The definitive imperialism for most of the world – not least because it was the imperialism that defined the modern world, the first truly global imperialism that transformed the world from regional to global.

Indeed, so much so that imperialism is often defined exclusively as European imperialism, particularly when you throw in my next three special mentions as offshoots of it to broaden it to Western imperialism.

This ignores that empires predated European imperialism throughout the world, well before the existence or even the concept of the European nations behind it. A substantial part of the impact of European imperialism lies in how recent it is, eclipsing any predecessors, and the wounds it inflicted are still raw. No one seeks reparations from Roman or Mongolian imperialism.

It’s striking to think that decolonization or independence is within living memory for many of the subjects of European imperialism, particularly in Africa, with some empires clinging on into the 1970s (looking at you, Portugal ) or even beyond in legacy or some residual colonies (looking at you, Hong Kong).

Equally it ignores that many of the states that fought or fell to European imperialism were themselves empires, often aggressively or belligerently so. Indeed, I’d say all of them, at least for any polities that comprised more than one ethnic group or beyond tribes and tribal confederations. Even more homogenous or tribal polities tended to be imperial in nature over their own members, in the absence of any concept of participatory representation, where they were not actually imperial to or over their neighbors.

Ironically, it was European political concepts that undermined the default imperial state settings that applied elsewhere or prior to them, as they would the European empires themselves.

However, European imperialism was distinctive in a number of ways so as to distinguish it as the modern definition of imperialism. One is that very factor – that it is recent or modern. Another is that it consisted almost entirely of maritime empires, as opposed to the more usual territorial empires conquering adjoining or neighboring territories by land. Of course, they are not the only maritime empires in history, but those other empires either tended to be more mixed between maritime and territorial conquests or lacked the same reach (or both).

And that last point brings us to the most distinctive feature of European imperialism – its unprecedented scope, scale, and transformative force, particularly when viewed collectively, as it tends to be outside Europe.

In terms of scale and scope, it reached to every metaphorical corner of the globe, including an unparalleled command of the seas (and even skies), and to every continent, including Antarctica. Only a few countries remained independent of one European empire or another – and even then independence was often only nominal or more a balance of power between competing European nations or spheres of influence. It is not for nothing that of the top ten empires in history by land area or size, four of them are European.

And in terms of transformative force, we are living in the world it made – “to which we owe the development of transport and communication” as well as “the spread of science and technology”, industry and trade, and European culture and political ideologies. Not to mention the spread of European languages as global lingua franca – English above all, but also French and Spanish.

And yes – that transformative force had its negative aspects, which indeed tend to be the focus of contemporary perspectives on European imperialism to the exclusion of anything else. Although history is not a balance sheet, all European powers were quite prepared to resort to brutality when they had to, albeit some more so than others, or else they wouldn’t have had any empires.

Although the rest of the world tends to see European imperialism collectively – with some justice – that does conceal that there was not one European imperial power but several, as a general rule fiercely competitive with each other. Indeed, the fierce competition between European nations is often identified as a reason for European imperialism in the first place, as European technological and other advancement owed itself to European nations competing – and warring – with each other.

It also conceals that there was more than one European imperialism within what was, after all, a span of over at least half a millennium. A common historical classification is to divide European imperialism into two broad phases, albeit overlapping – as for example with the classification of the British and French Empires into their First and Second Empires which largely reflects those phases (although the Spanish and Portuguese Empires might arguably be divided into three phases).

In the first phase, from Columbus’ “discovery” of the Americas in 1492 through to the early nineteenth century or so – often styled as the Age of Discovery – the subject of European imperialism was predominantly the Americas. European imperialism did extend to Africa and Asia but was limited – in Africa as tropical disease limited European encroachment into the continent’s interior (although European penetration of the continent’s coastline and the consequent Atlantic slave trade was damaging enough) and in Asia as its polities were mostly robust enough to resist direct conquest.

This phase was certainly marked by fierce competition between European powers, despite the early lead of Spain and Portugal, which cooperated with each other at least in dividing the world up into their respective spheres of influence, by papal mediation in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas (although only after Portugal nudged the line further west to party it up in Brazil).

Other European nations disagreed as three others competed with the Spanish and Portuguese to round out the big five imperial powers in this phase – the British (or English prior to 1707), the French, and after they became independent of Spain, the Dutch. The British and French eclipsed the Spanish and Portuguese as they fought in what was no less than an Anglo-French contest for global supremacy, fought particularly in North America and India.

That phase came to end with the first wave of decolonization or wars of independence by their American settler states, although substantial parts of the Americas remained in European empires or spheres of influence.

While the second phase effectively began before the end of the first phase, it acquired its full force after the Napoleonic Wars in what is often styled as the Age of Imperialism or New Imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, as the European powers descended on Asia and Africa, the latter styled as the Scramble for Africa.

While they remained competitive to the point of occasional conflict in this phase, the European powers were remarkably cooperative in negotiating their empires or spheres of influence, although a large part of that was necessity from British naval supremacy or Pax Britannica

European imperialism deserves and will get its own top 10 (and special mentions) to do it justice, not least for ranking the individual European imperial powers. The focus of this entry are the classic eight continental European imperial powers and their empires- British (who also rank third in my Top 10 Empires), Spanish (who also rank fifth in my Top 10 Empires), French, Dutch, Portuguese, Belgians, Germans and Italians.

Some might note that this omits a significant European empire, indeed the largest apart from the British – but this was distinctive and separate enough to earn its own special mention entry, as were the two other substantial non-European imperial powers in the Age of Imperialism.

A proper tier ranking of the classic eight will await their own top ten list for European empires, but Britain was obviously top dog in this phase of imperialism. Spain, which had been the British Empire of the first phase, was knocked down to mid-tier when most of its Latin American empire won its independence, then to bottom tier when defeated by the United States in the Spanish-American War.

France, the Netherlands, and Portugal all rank in high or mid-tier, with Belgium ranking in low tier for its abominations in the Congo – and latecomers Germany and Italy bringing up the rear in bottom-tier with the scraps left by other empires. Italy earned the particular humiliation of being defeated by Ethiopia, so that the latter remained the only African state to retain independence (apart from the American founded state of Liberia).

However, the charges of European imperialism don’t stop with the end of formal European empires, as European powers are charged with simply substituting neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism -“which leverages economic power” (or other forms of power and influence) “rather than military force” (or direct means of control) “in an informal empire”.

RATING: 5 STARS*****
S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Empires (Special Mention)

 

I introduced my Top 10 Wars of History on the basis that I’ve always found wars a fascinating subject of history, so it’s not surprising that I’ve also always found empires a fascinating subject of history, again from the fortunate perspective of being well removed from the sharp end of them – and have similarly ranked my Top 10 Empires of History.

But I don’t just have a top ten. As usual for my top tens, I have a whole host of special mentions. My usual rule is twenty special mentions – where the subject matter is prolific enough, as it is here – which I suppose would usually make each top ten a top thirty. My special mentions are also where I tend to have some fun with the subject category and splash out with some wilder entries.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Wars (Special Mention)

Raising the flag on Iwo Jima as memorialized by the west side of the Marine Corps War Memorial, Arlington Ridge Park, Virigina

 

I’ve always found wars a fascinating subject of history, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them. History, particularly military history, has always been something of a hobby of mine. So of course I have ranked my Top 10 Wars.

But I don’t just have a top ten. As usual for my top tens, I have a whole host of special mentions. My usual rule is twenty special mentions – where the subject matter is prolific enough, as it is here – which I suppose would usually make each top ten a top thirty. My special mentions are also where I tend to have some fun with the subject category and splash out with some wilder entries.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Empires (1) Roman Empire

The Roman Empire under Trajan 117 AD – by Tataryn for Wikipedia “Roman Empire” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

(1) ROMAN EMPIRE (753 BC – 1453 AD)

THE Empire. Pax Romana.

“The grandeur that was Rome” – enduring both as empire, and in its influence or legacy.

The empire that set the template for, and defined the concept of, empire in Western civilization. Literally, with the word empire originating in the Latin imperium, as well as the word emperor originating from Latin imperator – with the title of Caesar (from the man himself) as the origin of the German Kaiser and Russian or Slavic Czar.

It may lack the size of other empires but as the saying goes, it’s not the size but what you do with it, and in this case the Roman Empire is distinguished by its sheer endurance, both in the empire itself and in its influence or legacy – “there was once a dream that was Rome”.

The Roman Empire predates the formal institutions of empire founded by Augustus (in the first century BC) – with the Roman Republic as an imperial republic, a recurring political model in Western civilization from the Greek city states, which essentially laid almost all the foundations for Mediterranean supremacy and the empire itself. Hence my starting date as that attributed to the founding of Rome (by legend).

The Republic also saw some of the most definitive events and figures of Roman history – not least Julius Caesar, who lent his name to the title of emperor and is perhaps the figure most identified with the Empire, although it was his heir Augustus who founded it in the wake of Caesar’s assassination. Like a good car salesman, Augustus just slapped the formal institutions of empire on the pretense of authority of the Republic or Senate, and said this baby can fit a millennium and a half in it.

And it did, despite the best efforts of his most notorious heirs, Caligula and Nero, as well as the Year with Four Emperors, to run it off the road in the first century AD. At its peak in the second century under Trajan – second of the so-called Five Good Emperors – it extended from the Atlantic to the Tigris, and from Scotland to the Nile.

However, the Empire’s endurance is showcased not only by its ability to remain intact over such an extent over so long a period, but to rebound from collapse or defeat in a manner unlike the steady decline of most other empires. One of the most remarkable feats was that of rebounding from collapse or at least fragmentation under the emperor Aurelian – in only five years to boot – in the so-called Crisis of the Third Century, when apart from barbarian and Persian invasions, the empire also faced the breakaway Gallic and Palmyrene Empires.

Aurelian probably extended the lifespan of the unified empire by two centuries – although the empire divided itself into western and eastern halves for administration in the fourth century, which arguably favored the eastern half with the better position as the western half slowly crumbled and fell to the barbarians at its gates.

But for sheer endurance, the title has to go to the eastern Roman empire, which history has labelled the Byzantine Empire, which lasted for a millennium past the fall of the western half, including feats of rebounding from defeats that bordered on resurrection. More like Lazarus Empire, amirite?

The first of these remains the greatest, albeit not the most, ah, resurrectionary – under legendary emperor Justinian and his even more legendary general Belisarius, taking a damn good swing at reclaiming the fallen western empire, although in hindsight the Gothic War in Italy was probably a swing too far.

In the end however, the empire suffered one defeat too many – wounded, fatally as it turned out, from the Fourth Crusade that sacked Constantinople in 1204. While it even managed the sort of spirited comeback it had previously, it simply lacked the scale of time or resources to see it through, particularly against a rising rival empire in its prime – the Ottoman Empire, that finally conquered Constantinople in 1453.

As for its enduring legacy, let me count the ways – “language, religion, art, architecture, literature, philosophy, law, and forms of government”. Latin and Greek. Christianity – Catholic and Orthodox, with the former inheriting the capitol, pontifex, many of the trappings, and much of the mystique of the western empire. “The Roman Empire’s afterlife in European cultural and political memory is no less significant and important than its actual physical and temporal power in its height.”

 

The vexillum of the Roman Empire – a red banner with the letters SPQR (the Senate and the People of Rome) in Gold surrounded by a gold wreath hung on a military standard topped by a Roman eagle – by SsolbergJ for Wikipedia “Roman Empire” published under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/

DECLINE & FALL

And how!

THE decline and fall – they wrote the book on it. Well, actually, that was Edward Gibbon, but you know what I mean.

That “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, retreating to the breath of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear and naked shingles of the world”.

Even now, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire informs much modern discourse about state failure – from Edward Gibbon onwards, “we have been obsessed with the fall: it has been valued as an archetype for every perceived decline, and, hence, as a symbol for our own fears”.

As decline and fall, it involved the former as much as the latter – the Romans were consistently their own worst enemies, fighting their endless civil wars even with the barbarians at their gates.

There’s just something about the Romans desperately trying to hold one line after another in that “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” that resonates with me. Indeed, any last stand or waning force often invokes the fall of the Roman Empire, both in history, and in fantasy or science fiction (which often replays it).

THE ROMAN EMPIRE NEVER FELL

On the other hand, the Empire never fell, at least according to P.K. Dick. Or we’re on to our Third or Fourth Rome (or more), going by all the countries that have claimed succession to the Roman Empire. Or at least we’re still living in a Roman world.

THE SUN NEVER SETS

“For these I set no limits, world or time,
But make the gift of empire without end.

Yeah – get some Aeneid into you! Yes – technically the sun did set on the Roman Empire. But the sun never sets on my Roman Empire. Or, more seriously, its legacy – from the global Roman Catholic Church to the republican forms of government adopted in the Americas.

EVIL EMPIRE

Again – and how! Ooo – I’d say crucifixions all round, Flavius!

Friends, Romans, countrymen – you know I love me some Romanitas, but you have to admit the Roman Empire would rank high in a top ten of evil empires. The Romans were absolutely brutal in conquering or enslaving their enemies (or anyone really) and suppressing rebellions or revolts.

Historians might argue over whether they were more brutal than other polities or by the standards of their time – I’ve certainly seen some argue that it was, including one entertaining argument that attributed it to lead poisoning from their water pipes. It certainly is entertaining to imagine the Romans as a bunch of lead-crazed psychos, running around like Patrick Bateman.

But you know you’re evil when people put a pox on your pax – “to plunder, to slaughter, to usurp, they give the lying name of empire; and where they make a desert, they call it peace.” And that was from a Roman, Tacitus, although he put those words in the mouth of a Caledonian chieftain, whether that was apocryphal or otherwise.

Or when Christians – one of the groups repressed by the Romans, even if, almost unique in history, they did manage to pull off their great messianic ghost dance and win, conquering the empire itself – write you into their apocalypse as the Whore of Babylon (even if she is kinda hot), and your emperor (or a weird resurrected zombie version of Nero) as the Beast of the Apocalypse.

RATING: 5 STARS*****
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Top Tens – History: Top 10 Wars (1) Second World War

Taxis to Hell – and Back – Into the Jaws of Death, an iconic image of men of the 16th Infantry Regiment, US 1st Infantry Division wading ashore from their landing craft on Omaha Beach on the morning of D-Day, 6 June 1944, public domain image photographed by Chief Photographer’s Mate (CPHoM) Robert F. Sargent (and used in Wikipedia “Normandy landings”)

 

(1) SECOND WORLD WAR (1939-1945)

 

Yes – it’s the big one. The Cold War may have threatened to be bigger, but there are no world wars to rival the wars that are officially known as such, particularly the Second World War, which was more destructive, extensive and pervasive than the First, despite largely being a continuation of it.

The narrative of WW2 is worthy of its top ten and is well known, even in popular culture and imagination, albeit often distorted or sensationalized. It featured almost every aspect of modern warfare, while remaining unique in others – not least being fought to a conclusive result and destruction of enemy states rarely paralleled in modern history.

My favorite historian of it – H.P. Willmott – has quipped that, paradoxically, WW2 might be regarded as the last war of the 19th century and WW1 was the first war of the 20th century. I understand that to mean WW2 was closer to 19th century wars, in part because the technology and technique of offensive mobility won out over defensive firepower and attrition – briefly and with waning effect through the war’s duration – while its predecessor was more characteristic of 20th century wars that followed it.

Or alternatively, WW2 was closer to the model of the Franco-Prussian War, at least in its European opening, or the Napoleonic Wars in its continuation within Europe. On the other hand, WW1 was closer to the American Civil War as the true precursor of twentieth century warfare, with the western front of the latter resembling the eastern theater of the latter, only with even more lethal firepower. Indeed, WW1 is sometimes dubbed a European Civil War. It’s a pity that European powers, particularly Germany, seemed to have reflected less on the American Civil War than the Franco-Prussian War for future wars.

Ironically, however, WW1 finished by armistice in a manner closer to the Franco-Prussian War except with France and Germany reversed, while the WW2 was fought to unconditional surrender like the American Civil War. For that matter, H.P. Willmott has also observed that the war of the United States against Japan in WW2 uncannily resembled the former’s war against the Confederacy.

And speaking of the United States, my own quip is that the Second World War is the American Iliad, while the Cold War is the American Odyssey. USA! USA! USA!

 

ART OF WAR

The theme of H.P. Willmott’s The Great Crusade – the best single-volume history of the war – is the refutation of the popular myth of German military excellence. As he paraphrased Oscar Wilde, to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness.

Contrary to the art of war, Germany military genius lay in fighting, not in war. When it came to understanding war and waging it, Germany was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies – a situation shared by Germany’s ally Japan. All Germany managed to achieve in two world wars was its encirclement and attrition by enemies with superior resources.

 

WORLD WAR

Well, obviously.

 

STILL FIGHTING THE WAR

Not so obviously – although the two world wars were essentially Europe’s new Thirty Years War 1914-1945. And of course beyond that, there was the cold war – such that some historians have classed both world wars and the Cold War as the Long War 1914-1991. And beyond that…

 

GOOD GUYS VS BAD GUYS

Again, well obviously – with WW2 probably the closest example in history to an actual war in black and white moral terms. To quote Bart Simpson, there are no good wars, with the following exceptions – the American Revolution, World War Two and the Star Wars trilogy.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

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Top Tens – History: Top 10 Books (1) H.P. Willmott – The Great Crusade

Raising the flag over the Reichstag – one of the most iconic images of WW2 (as photographed by Yevgeny Khaldei and in public domain), used for the cover of the first edition of the book (and also for its own article on Wikipedia “Raising a flag over the Reichstag”)

 

(1) HP WILLMOTT –

THE GREAT CRUSADE: A NEW COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1989)

 

The best single “volume history of the Second World War in its coverage of all the major themes and all the fronts”.

And for that matter, as you can tell by my placement of it in first place, my favorite volume of history for any subject – the one most firmly embedded in my psyche and the one to which I return the most, particularly on the subject of WW2, with insights or nuggets on almost every page.

For example, comparing the Pacific War to the American Civil War, with the former having uncanny parallels to the latter, even down to the two main American (or Union) offensive directions of each, with Imperial Japan similarly doomed to defeat as the Confederacy and for much the same reasons.

Or the transposition between Germany and the Soviet Union in military proficiency, such that by 1944-1945 the latter arguably equalled or surpassed the former at its peak, while Germany matched many of the same failings for the Soviets back in 1941.

Indeed, most of my own views of the Second World War originate in this book. Much of that is due to the style of Willmott, a strangely neglected or overlooked military historian – to quote excerpts from an Amazon review:

“Interesting, insightful, revelatory…Willmott is Willmott: never less than lucid and coherent, even when his work descends into the “mere chronicle” of army, corps and divisional movements that more properly belong to purely military history…magisterial is no more than an appropriate term with which to describe Willmott’s informative – indeed, transformative – and succinctly and clearly expressed synthesis of the knowledge on such a wide subject.”

Above all, my view of the Second World War originates in Willmott’s main theme or thesis of the book, which he was nice enough to state at the outset – debunking the myth of German military excellence. Indeed, he cheekily adapts Oscar Wilde’s famous quote from The Importance of Being Earnest – to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness

This might seem paradoxical given the extent of Germany’s initial victories – and the Allied effort required to reverse those victories and defeat Germany – but almost as paradoxically, Willmott argues this just illustrates his theme, that Germany could succeed to that extent but still lose.

However, the paradox is resolved by Willmott’s argument, which he repeatedly demonstrates throughout the book, that “the German military genius was in fighting not in war, and along with her Japanese ally Germany was the only great power that did not understand the nature of war.”

One might add that this is the converse of the art of war, at least according to Sun Tzu – and of the Allies in general and the United States in particular. As Willmott observes, in terms of actually waging war, Germany was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies, matched only by the similar hopelessness of their ally Japan.

Willmott has yet another striking insight in his speculation about the reason for this – that the very success of Bismarck, the one German leader who had understood war, that is the limits of military and national power, “blinded successive generations of Germans to these realities because they saw only his military victories”.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

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