(7) SOVIET-JAPANESE WAR

(11 MAY – 16 SEPTEMBER 1939 / 8 AUGUST – 2 SEPTEMBER 1945)

 

It has always struck me as somewhat anomalous that two of the major combatants of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan, scrupulously avoided fighting each other for almost all the conflict, despite being on opposing sides and despite it obviously being to the detriment of Japan’s ally Germany.

Not that, on the latter point (and according to my reading), Germany particularly sought out Japanese involvement in its war against the Soviet Union – at least not until Germany’s initial victories began to wane to the point that Germany considered it might need Japanese involvement after all, by which point it was too little too late.

Hence Japan signed the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 13 April 1941, a little over two months before Germany invaded the Soviet Union – reflecting how little Germany had coordinated with or even informed Japan with respect to its intentions. Hence also the term scrupulously I used for the Soviet Union and Japan avoiding fighting each other – scrupulously that is, in terms of abiding by the Non-Aggression Pact.

And as I stated before, despite that scrupulousness on Japan’s part obviously being to the detriment of Japan’s ally Germany – reflected in, among other things, about half of American Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union in the war against Germany being shipped through the Pacific, as long as the ships had Russian flags (which I anticipate would simply have been a matter of lending them those ships or assigning ships Russian flags).

It’s even more anomalous when one considers the long-standing Japanese hostility to the Soviet Union – and indeed the Russian empire before that, Japan’s first European military adversary. Japan had both the largest and longest military intervention in the Russian Civil War, which persisted until Japan finally withdrew from Siberia and the Russian Pacific Far East in 1922.

The initial target of the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s was also the Soviet Union – outside of course the Japanese annexation of Manchuria, from which Japanese militarists began looking towards the Soviet Union – before that particular party of militarists was suppressed by other militarists looking towards China and elsewhere, although that didn’t stop repeated minor clashes with the Soviet Union on the Manchurian border or in Mongolia.

One can see why the Soviet Union stuck scrupulously to the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in its existential struggle against Germany, but less so for Japan. One factor was of course that both the navy and Japan’s need for resources, particularly oil, advocated the “Southern Strategy” against European Asian colonies (and the United States) as opposed to the “Northern Strategy” (against the Soviet Union) that was the contending strategy proposed, typically by the army, in war councils.

The other factor was the healthy respect that Japan had for the Soviet forces opposing them – something I share in terms of my uncertainly whether any Japanese involvement against the Soviet Union in 1941, when it was most optimal for Japan (and Germany), would have actually made any different to the outcome.

That respect arose from the first of the Soviet-Japanese wars that did occur during the Second World War, interestingly enough with those two wars bookending the main conflict at start and finish.

Indeed, the first Soviet-Japanese war commenced six months before the commencement of the war in Europe with the German invasion of Poland and indeed continued for a fortnight or so into the European war. However, it was kept mostly secret by both combatants – the Soviet Union presumably to avoid undermining its position against Germany and Japan because its army was soundly defeated by that of the Soviet Union, notably at Khalkhin Gol.

The Japanese defeat in this war, particularly at Khalkhin Gol, has taken on some notoriety in history since the Second World War – rightly so in my opinion, as having an importance on the outcome of events in the Second World War that were somewhat obscured by its secrecy at the time. In some ways, it is a pity that it wasn’t publicized more widely – as it, and Japanese intelligence on the strength of Soviet forces, might otherwise had some impact on German decisions, at least if the latter had been in the minds of more rational actors.

The other Soviet-Japanese war bookend came at the end of the Second World War, after Germany had surrendered – and in the form of the Soviet Union honoring its promise to the United States to commit to war against Japan. Ironically – and somewhat incredibly – Japan at this time harbored delusions that, consistent with the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviets could help Japan negotiate a more lenient peace.

Instead, the Soviets scrapped the Pact and absolutely smashed Japan’s Kwangtung Army in Manchuria – indeed proceeding into Korea and Japan’s northernmost island possessions.

While the Japanese army had previously romped through China in the absence of the latter’s industrial capacity and hence armored forces, now it faced the Soviet army – pretty much defined by its armored forces or tanks – honed to perfection fighting and winning against Germany.

As the War Nerd (Gary Brecher) colorfully observed in a column on this war – “This was a campaign between two great empires—both gone now, it occurs to me—but one, the Soviet, was at the absolute top of its game, and the other, Imperial Japan, was dying and insane.”

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

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