(7) JOHN ELLIS –

BRUTE FORCE: ALLIED STRATEGY & TACTICS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1990)

 

Quantity has a quality all of its own.

Stalin is reputed to have said this, aptly enough about the Soviet armed forces in the Second World War. It’s probably apocryphal but I like to think that the fact it and other zingers are attributed to him implies an ability to drop one-liners unparalleled by any other war leader than Churchill – and certainly far exceeding Hitler. It amuses me to think that above all else, the Allies won the war of one-liners, the most important war of all. In modern internet parlance, you might say the Axis couldn’t meme.

More relevantly, if you were to sum up this book’s theme and thesis in one line, Stalin’s would do nicely, except that for both his Soviet forces and those of the Allies, it was a somewhat poor quality – the brute force of the title, grinding to a slower and more costly victory than might otherwise have been the case. In other words, war by attrition – and often not too different from the bloody attrition of the First World War for which that conflict’s military leadership is often faulted.

I obviously like Ellis as a historian – his Social History of the Machine Gun was similarly illuminating and insightful – although sadly his books seem somewhat neglected these days and can be elusive to find.

This book remains my favorite by Ellis – as well as one of my favorite general or thematic histories of the Second World War, exceeded only by my entry in top spot, which might arguably be paired together as alternatives (or correctives) to each other.

It certainly was an eye-opening look at Allied strategy and tactics in the war – and his critiques of their lack of finesse, proficiency or skill are persuasive, as for example with RAF Marshal Sir Arthur Harris’ area bombing dogma, a common subject of historical (and moral) criticism.

On the other hand, such critiques are easy to overstate in hindsight, particularly as opposed to the contemporary reality where each theater competed with the others, demanding troops and resources in very different ways and that could not be used elsewhere – or planning or production line decisions well in advance but which took substantial periods of time to change to battlefield requirements.

As opposed to my top spot entry (as something of an antidote), the book does lean into a historical pet peeve of mine – that tendency, dubbed in some internet circles as ‘wehraboo’ (a play on Wehrmacht and ‘weeaboo’ as slang for excessive or obsessive anime fandom), to disparage the Allies compared to so-called German military ‘excellence”.

While I would accept arguments that the Germans were the most consistent in their tactical proficiency throughout the war, albeit not so much in their strategy, much of the critiques Ellis makes about Allied “brute force” might also be made about German military successes.

In fairness, Ellis does make much of the same critiques about the Germans, particularly as the wheels started to fall off their blitzkrieg. However, the book overlooks the extent to which initial German successes relied not just on good luck and timing in a somewhat narrow window of opportunity, but also on significant advantages over their adversaries at the outset – advantages which arguably weren’t effectively matched by the comparable advantages in manpower and materiel by the Allies against them until 1944, at which point the Germans collapsed in a rapid manner similar to their own initial adversaries.

It also overlooks that the Germans owed their endurance in defense, at least in part, to the improvements in defensive firepower from that at the outset of the war, as well as their undoubted tactical proficiency in defense that enabled them to outfight numerically superior enemies until 1944.

I also took away from the book something else from the “brute force” of its title about Allied superiority – just how foolhardy the three major Axis nations in general were and Germany in particular was to decide on war in the first place, resembling nothing so much as a twentieth century version of the ghost dance seeking to conjure victory out of “triumph of the will”.

Germany and Japan even sought to make a virtue out of necessity by vaunting their so-called martial and psychological superiority over the material strength of their adversaries. History generally has a name for nations that do so – losers.

It also overlooks that Allied superiority was hard-earned. Material strength doesn’t just, well, materialize but takes a very real achievement in mobilizing manpower and materiel – one in which the Allies massively outclassed the Axis and one which is highlighted further by the fact that Germany had managed to occupy a productive potential in Europe to rival the United States but was still massively out-produced by the latter.

Italy is often disparaged for its performance in the war, particularly compared to Germany, but the underlying reality was not too different between them, albeit kept at bay for longer by Germany’s greater industrial base and tactical proficiency – such that I like to adapt the late Cold War quip about the Soviet Union being “Upper Volta with rockets” to Germany being “Italy with rockets”, in a very literal sense.

 

RATING: 4 STARS****

A-TIER (TOP TIER)